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Introduction
My aim in this thesis is to examine one of the distinctions that 
can be made between actions. It is, I think, a fairly central one in the 
philosophy of action, and its significance may be marked by its application 
in ethics, philosophical psychology, the philosophy of law and even 
aesthetics. My primary concern however, has been with the problem of 
making a workable definition of the distinction, rather than with its 
application.
In the first chapter I examine Kenny's definition of state, 
performance and activity verbs, which is the most comprehensive account 
that has so far been given. I also examine one of the strongest 
criticisms of Kenny's distinction, that of Evans, and a similar 
distinction made by Vendler. I conclude by arguing the impossibility 
of making the distinction in terms of verbs, and questioning whether a 
purely grammatical account is possible.
In the second chapter I examine further possible ways of giving a 
purely grammatical account, and argue against the capacity of such 
accounts to cover all possible cases. I then comment on the problems 
that are encountered when the search for a purely grammatical account 
is abandoned; problems in the characterisation of action, of the intention 
of the agent, etc. I conclude by asserting that existing attempts to give 
a comprehensive definition of the distinction seem inadequate and that the 
distinction seems to be a far more profound and complex one than might 
initially be supposed.
In the final chapter I argue for an alternative way of approaching the 
distinction and suggest other alternatives that might be pursued. I 
conclude the thesis by outlining the way in which the distinction might be 
applied as a means for identifying the extent to which an agent may be 
rationalising his action in order to avoid responsibility for a wrong doing.
Chapter 1. The grammatical account
J.L. Austin, in 'A Plea for Excuses' deplores the fact that the 
idea of 'doing an action' is commonly taken to be '...a self-explanatory, 
ground-level description, one which brings adequately into the open the 
essential features of everything that comes, by simple inspection, under 
it', and sees the need to introduce 'some classification into the vast 
miscellany of "actions"'. The distinction between performances and 
activities seems to be one such attempt. In this chapter I shall look 
at the most comprehensive existing formulation of the distinction, that 
of A. Kenny/ and also examine similar tense distinctions made by Z. Vendler 
which, though not specifically designed to relate to actions in the same 
way that Kenny's seem to be, are closely related to Kenny's enterprise 
in so far as both are grammatical distinctions between what are commonly 
known as 'verbs of action'.
I . The criterion
Kenny makes his distinction in terms of types of verb used. He 
distinguishes performance and activity verbs from static verbs by the 
fact that (Rule 1) static verbs cannot take continuous tenses whereas the 
other two can; e.g. I can be growing up or living in Rome, but I cannot 
be being happy.
Performance verbs are distinguished from activity verbs by means of the 
fact that (Rule 2) with performance verbs 'x is 6 ing' implies 'x has not 
6 ed', whereas in the case of activity verbs 'x is 6 ing' implies 'x has gSed'; 
e.g. that I am sitting on a chair implies that I have sat on that chair in 
the case of performance verbs.
1 A. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will. London 1963, Ch.VIII.
2Now this distinction I think, fails. And the main reason for this
is that he does not make a distinction between the continuous and the
non-continuous use of the perfect tense. In illustrating his point in
relation to activity verbs he says:
... if I am living in Rome it does not follow that I have 
not lived in Rome; on the contrary told that I am living 
in Rome you may at once ask "And how long have you lived 
in Rome?". As with "live in Rome" so with "giggle", "listen 
to", "keep a secret", "ponder on"; in all these cases, "A 
is 6 ing" implies not "A has not <b ed" but rather "A has 
6 ed" (op. cit. p.172).
Kenny is here making two claims:
1) for all performance verbs "A is 6 ing" implies 
"A has not 6 ed"
2) for all activity verbs "A is 6 ing" implies 
"A has 6 ed"
He uses 'living in Rome' as an example of an activity verb such that
'A is living in Rome' implies 'A has lived in Rome'. But it is not clear
that this implication always holds. There is an ambiguity in the meaning 
of 'A has lived in Rome' between (a) a case where A has lived in Rome 
at some previous time stretch, but is not living in Rome now, in which case 
(2) above would be false, since 'A is living in Rome' would not imply 'A has 
lived in Rome' (or 'A has not lived in Rome') and (b) where 'A has lived in 
Rome' means the same as 'A has been living in Rome and still is'. But one 
can also say 'A has been building a house and still is'; therefore, where 
'A has 6 ed' has the same force as 'A has been 6 ing and still is', it
would not be true that 'A is 6 ing' implies 'A has not 6 ed', which would
make (1) false.
To summarise: Either the continuous and non-continuous perfect tenses 
are equivalent in meaning or they are not. If they are, then it is not 
true that 'A is 6 ing' implies 'A has not <b ed' in the case of performance 
verbs. If they are not then equivalent then it is false that 'A is 6 ing'
3implies 'A has 6 ed' in the case of activity verbs. Since there is a 
workable distinction between these verbs if 'A has 6 ed' is not taken 
as equivalent to 'A has been 6 ing and still is', it seems appropriate 
to assume that the continuous and non-continuous perfect are not equivalent. 
But this would require, according to my argument, a modification of (2) 
such that, with activity verbs, while it is not true that 'A is 6 ing' 
implies either 'A has 6 ed' or 'A has not 6 ed', 'A is 6 ing', with 
activity verbs, does not imply 'A has not 6 ed', while it does in the 
case of performance verbs.
It may be objected that this is just a case of unhappy choice of 
examples. It is certainly true that there are certain verbs which take 
a continuous tense for which this does not apply, namely, for example, 
'winning' or 'reaching'. To say 'x is winning' does not necessarily imply 
'x has been winning'. But there is also a further difference between this 
latter type of verb and Kenny's performance and activity verbs. This is 
that 'x is winning' does not always mean the same as 'x wins'. For 
example, x is running a race. At one stage of the race it may be true 
to say 'x is winning'. But at the closing stages of the whole thing (or 
any other stage for that matter) it is possible for this assertion to be 
made false, i.e. if he is overtaken at the finish. This type of verb cuts 
straight across Kenny's distinction between performance and activity verbs. 
For in the one instance, when x is winning but the race is not yet over,
'x is winning' does perhaps imply 'x has been winning', but not 'x has won'; 
which makes winning a performance verb. Whereas in another instance, where 
x's winning finishes the race, 'x wins' implies 'x has won' which makes 
it an activity verb, but does not necessarily imply 'x has been winning'.
(He may have leapt to the lead at the last moment - does this last moment 
validate the claim that he must have been winning even if it was only for 
one-tenth of a second? If it does it is a different sense of 'having been
4winning'; there is a clear sense in which 'x wins'may be consistent with 
'x has not been winning'.) This latter point differentiates 'winning', 
and verbs like it, from both performance and activity verbs, a fact which 
Kenny fails to take into account. So his distinction between activity 
and performance verbs also fails to embrace all verbs which take a contin­
uous tense."*" But it is still possible to distinguish performance from 
activity verbs which relate to the criterion Kenny has given, from the fact 
that there is a difference in the way in which these two types of verb 
fail to imply the non-continuous perfect from the present tense. For 
while 'x is living in Rome' does not necessarily imply 'x had lived in 
Rome', 'x is building a house' implies necessarily not 'x has built a 
house'. To put it formally:
Activity - 'x is 6 ing' does not entail 'x has 6 ed'
Performance - 'x is 6 ing' entails 'x has not 6 ed'
Kenny, when formulating this distinction, puts it as follows:
Activity - A is <b ing only if A has 6 ed - which 
according to my argument, is false.
Performance - A is 6 ing only if A has not 6 ed - which 
is true.
Thus it seems that Kenny must weaken his assertion about activity
2verbs. A similar point is made by Timothy C. Potts about Aristotle's 
distinction between actions which have, and those that lack, a limit, but 
is not argued in any detail.
1 Cf also C.O. Evans 'States, Activities and Performances', Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, vol.45, 1967.
2 'States, Activities and Performances', Proc. Aristot. Soc. Supp., vol. 
XXXIX, 1965, p .67.
5II. Distinguishing features: from perfect to present tense
After giving these basic criteria, Kenny goes on to outline various
distinguishing features of the three types of verb. And the first
assertion he makes seems rather less than obvious. This is that in the
case of static verbs 'x has 6 ed' implies 'x ^s';
We use such expressions as "I have loved her for seven 
years" or "I have been afraid of this all day" only when 
I still do love or when I still am afraid. If I have 
ceased to do so, or be so, then we most commonly use not 
the perfect but the simple preterite; "I loved her",
"I was afraid of this", (op. cit. p.173)
As it stands this general rule seems to rest on pretty weak 
foundations. There is nothing to prevent me saying 'I'm miserable now 
although I have been happy in the past'. I cannot see immediate grounds, 
other than the fact that Kenny says so, for arguing that the preterite
should be used here rather than the perfect tense. If there are logical
reasons for this, Kenny certainly has not given them.
Further, it can be seen that if 'x has 6 ed' , which he translates in 
his examples relating to static verbs as 'x has been 6 \  implies 'x ^s'
in the case of static verbs, it is also the case that 'x has been 6 ing'
implies 'x 6s (or is 6 ing)' in the case of both performance and activity 
verbs. I take it that what Kenny means in making this point about static 
verbs is that as soon as one can say, for example, 'I have been happy', it 
is true to say 'I am happy'. Kenny claims that when one has a static 
verb in the perfect tense, it is appropriate to add '...and still am' 
as in 'I have been happy and still am'. But by the same token this feature 
also applies to 'I have been building this house for six months and still 
am', and to 'I have been living in Rome for three years and still am'. So 
it is difficult to see how this serves as a distinguishing feature of
static verbs.
6III. From present to future perfect
The next distinguishing feature that Kenny identifies relates to 
performance verbs. This is that, given that the statement 'x ^s' is 
true, it will not always be true in the future to say 'x has <b ed'; 
whereas this does not apply to static and activity verbs. 'Alf is 
walking to the Rose and Crown' may be true now, he says, but it does 
not necessarily follow that in the future it will be true to say 'Alf 
has walked to the Rose and Crown'. He does clarify this, or rather 
qualify it:
To be sure, if Mary is knitting a sweater, then it 
will be true that Mary was knitting a sweater, and 
we might say that the past tense which corresponds 
to the non-frequentative present is not the simple 
past tense.
In general, it is only once A has 6 ed, that we can 
say that it will be true that A 6 ed. It is therefore 
only when a present-tensed proposition contains a verb 
for which the inference from present to perfect holds 
that we can say that the corresponding simple-past- 
tensed proposition will be true. And the inference 
from present to perfect holds only for certain states 
and activities, not for performances, (op. cit. p.176)
Kenny now appears to be making a distinction which he had previously
ignored. In the same way as it is true that the fact that Mary is
knitting a sweater implies that she was knitting a sweater, that she is
knitting a sweater implies that she has been knitting a sweater. 'Was'
and 'has been' seem to convey the same thing here, since, although the
former is a non-perfect tense, they are both continuous. Thus he does
seem to be making the sort of distinction that I made earlier; that is,
between 'has 6 ed' and 'has been 6 ing'.
But let us unlock the expository part of the above quotation. In 
the first place Kenny is no longer talking about types of verb, but about 
the real thing - performances, activities and states per se. This suggests
that Kenny assumes that wherever there is a statement using a particular
7type of verb, there the relevant performance, activity or state is always 
to be found; or, to put it another way, that one type of verb cannot be 
used as the main verb in a description of an event having a different 
name from that of the type of that verb. For example, an activity verb 
cannot be used as the main verb in the description of a performance.
But since counter-examples immediately spring to mind - 'he builds houses' 
seems by all accounts the description of an activity, while Kenny gives 
the verb 'to build' as a performance verb - some refinement is clearly 
needed if this suggestion is going to work, if it does at all.
But to return to the main argument here. He says that 'with performance 
verbs the past tense which corresponds to the non-frequentative present 
is not the simple past tense'.
It appears that what Kenny wants to say in this passage can be put 
in terms of continuous and non-continuous usage. For, as has been seen 
in the examples he gives, he contrasts the continuous past, 'was knitting' 
with the non-continuous past, 'knitted'. And I shall assume that what he 
means by the 'simple past tense' is the same as what I call non-continuous 
past tense. Under this interpretation his argument would be roughly that, 
while 'x is 6 ing' implies that it will be true that 'x has been 6 ing'
(or 'has been 6 ' in the case of static verbs) with all three verbs, it is 
only in the case of performance verbs that 'x «$s' will not necessarily 
imply 'x has ed' . This is true, but here again the problem of types of 
verb like 'winning' crop up. 'X is winning' does not imply that it will 
be true that x has won. And it has been seen that 'winning' is neither 
a performance nor an activity verb.
IV. Taking, lasting, and going on for, a time
The next point he makes is that only performance verbs can take time; 
states last for a time, he says, and activities go on for a time, but
neither take time. It is not clear what this idea of 'taking time' is.
8For there does seem to be an un-objectionable sense in which one may- 
talk of activities taking time. He says; '...one may giggle for five 
minutes, but one does not take five minutes to giggle' (op. cit. p.176).
But here he is twisting language to suit his own purpose. For it seems 
quite sensible to say that x took five minutes in which to giggle, and 
it seems even more meaningful to say that giggling, listening to, weeping, 
laughing - examples Kenny gives of activity verbs - all take time, as 
well as going on for a time. In fact I am not sure what the difference 
between taking, going on for, and lasting for, a time is. All convey an 
idea of continuousness and all are capable of being given a definite 
determination, having a beginning and an end. It seems that such grammatical 
pointers need greater explanation than has been given. Following the same 
vein, Kenny says: 'performances are performed in a period to time; states
and activities are prolonged for a period of time. We travel to Rome in 
three days, and stay there for three days. If we spend an hour in a 
successful search for a thimble, then we look for it for an hour and find 
it In an hour'. (Ibid.) But what is one to make of the statement 'in 
three days she laughed a lot'? Did not the laughing occur iji a period of 
time? My objection here is not so much to the fact that these grammatical 
expressions may be used to indicate a difference in temporal reference - 
that after all is presumably their function. It is rather that Kenny is 
in danger of being too rigid in exalting their function to one in which 
they can serve to distinguish types of verb. While he does not expressly 
say so, the suggestion is that one can use these expressions to make a 
distinction just by looking at their uses in a sentence. This is not true 
in all cases since, as my examples have indicated, there may be instances 
where one of these expressions, such as 'in' as in 'in three days she 
laughed a lot', may cross the categories Kenny has stipulated. And in
cases such as this Kenny must say in defence that the expression is being
9used in a deviant way. But once he makes this move the expressions 
lose their value as grammatical criteria.
These expressions also raise questions about the way in which these 
verbs refer to different ways in which actions are placed in time. I 
will be dealing with this later at greater length since I think the role 
of temporal considerations is crucial to the distinction.
V . Quickly and slowly
He then goes on to say that only performance verbs can be qualified
by the adverbs 'quickly' and 'slowly'. But here again it seems quite
meaningful to say 'he laughed slowly'. And he seems to admit the weakness
of the assertion when he attempts to meet this objection:
Of course, one can see a joke quickly or slowly, 
just as one can take a long time to see a joke, though 
seeing a joke is not a performance; but this merely 
means that the time between hearing or seeing a joke 
was short or long, not that the seeing of the joke was 
something which it took a shorter or longer time to 
complete. Only performances can be complete or 
incomplete. Contrast "I've not yet finished drying 
the baby", and "I'm half-way through drinking the 
whisky" with "I'm half-way through wanting a drink".
Activities and states may be prolonged indefinitely 
or they may cease; performances come to a definite 
end and are finished. I can go on keeping a secret 
for ever; I can only go on telling a secret until it 
is told. (op. cit. p.177)
Well, first, he seems to have rejected the criterion in terms of 
the adverbs 'quickly' and 'slowly' only applying to performance verbs, 
in favour of another, that of the completeness of performances. But here 
again the distinction seems rather unsatisfactory. For why is it not 
possible to say 'I've not yet finished laughing at the joke' or 'I'm 
half-way through pondering this problem and you've interrupted my activity'. 
I think here that it might well be argued that laughing and pondering are 
referred to as performances in this context. But this possibility is 
implicitly ruled out by Kenny in view of his assumption that performance
10
verbs can only be used to refer to performances, activity verbs to 
activities, and static verbs to states.
And surely, performances can in principle be prolonged indefinitely, 
at least as long as it is meaningful to talk of states and activities in 
this way, i.e. until the agent dies. In principle, although admittedly 
extremely unlikely in practice, a may could go on telling a secret for 
the rest of his life. (It may be a very long story or he may be shot by 
an impatient listener while still telling it.) And this fact seems to be 
necessary if he is to retain his claim that in the case of performance 
verbs 'x 6s' does not imply that it will be true in the future that 
'x has 6 ed'. For under this claim 'x is telling a secret' does not imply 
that it will be true that x has told a secret.
It may be objected that if the man dies while keeping the secret, 
he may still be said to be keeping it, whereas of course he could never 
be said to be still telling it once he is dead. But this involves rather 
a poetic use of language. For it is not clear what meaning can be given 
to the statement 'x, qua corpse, is keeping the secret' if it is not 
possible for x, qua corpse, to reveal it. And this distinction becomes 
even more implausible in the case of laughing. It seems that one is likely 
to be keeping a secret just as indefinitely (or just as definitely for 
that matter) as when one is laughing.
VI. Bringing it about that p 
Kenny then says:
Performances are brought to an end by states. Any 
performance is describable in the forms "bringing it 
about that p". Washing the dishes is bringing it 
about that the dishes are clean; learning French is 
bringing it about that I know French, walking to Rome 
is bringing it about that I am in Rome... One 
performance differs from another in accordance with 
the difference between the states of affairs brought 
about: performances are specified by their ends.
(op. cit. p.177-8).
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He seems here to be making two main points:
1) Performances are brought to an end by states. Any performance 
is describable in the form 'bringing it about that p'.
2) 'One performance differs from another in accordance with the 
differences between the states of affairs brought about; 
performances are specified by their ends.'
Is this a distinctive feature of performances? It certainly seems to be 
the case that activities are not brought to an end by states, if only 
because activities are not brought to an end in the same way as performances 
are.
But then is Kenny saying that only performances are describable in 
the form 'bringing it about that p '? Well it seems that in at least some 
cases it is possible to redescribe an activity as 'bringing it about that 
p'. A can be walking for the exercise. The activity of walking can now 
be described as 'bringing it about that p' where p is the state of having 
been exercised.
But, it may be objected, in the case of this activity, p does not 
terminate the action, in the same way that a given state can terminate a 
performance. So that now the distinguishing feature is not so much that 
a performance is describable as bringing it about that p, but rather that 
the p is the terminal point of the performance, and specifies it.
But in what sense does the end of a performance specify it? A is 
building a house. The terminal point, p, beyond which A cannot continue 
building the same house, is the state which obtains when it is true to 
say 'the house has been built'. But as Q. Skinner^- points out, 'The only 
truth ... which this form of analysis seems to yield ... is that these 
verbs of action are capable of being put through a passive transformation', 
and that 'if the analysis is to be rescued from this triviality, it is
1 Q. Skinner 'On Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions'. Unpublished 
paper read at Canberra 1970.
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obvious what we must do; assign some independent value to the 'p ’ which 
is said to be brought about whenever a performance takes place'.
But it seems that any such attempt to find an independent ’p ’ fails 
to 'specify the performance' in the manner Kenny wants, since to be 
independent is to lack the logical relation that is required for the p 
to carry out the required job of specification. And if the p seems to 
have this specifying function, the description 'bringing it about that p' 
ceases to be a distinguishing feature of performancesand sinks into 
triviality. It does seem however that the idea of the terminal point of 
an action is crucial to the distinction, and I hope its significance becomes 
clearer as the discussion proceeds.
VII. Commanded and voluntary actions
In conclusion Kenny points out that only performances can be commanded, 
and thus all performances are voluntary. And secondly that all performances 
are distinguished from states in that they have purposes, while only some 
activities have purposes. This is an issue which I wish to discuss below 
so I will leave it for the moment.
VIII. Summary of Kenny
The distinguishing features outlined in the first four sections all 
relate to the question of tenses, and there appears to be an underlying 
confusion about the use of the continuous and non-continuous past tense.
I have argued that his assertion that 'x has 6 ed' in the case of static 
verbs, implies that 'x 6s', is false. But, if true, it would parallel the 
criterion for distinguishing static verbs from the other two types, since 
the implication from past to present only applies in the continuous perfect 
tense with performance and activity verbs; and thus, since static verbs 
cannot take a continuous use, the distinction would have carried over.
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Secondly, he asserts that only in the case of performance verbs does 
'x is b ing' fail to imply 'x will have b ed'. While I hope that I have 
demonstrated the falsity of this proposition, the distinction between 
continuous and non-continuous usage is again relevant, since it has been 
indicated that 'x is  ^ing' implies 'x will have been ^ing' in the case 
of both performance and activity verbs.
The claim that performances take time, activities go on for a time, 
and states last for a time has a close connection with the criterion for 
distinguishing performance from activity verbs. If Jones is taking three 
months to build a house - performance - he has not built it. While if 
Smith is going on living in Rome he has already been living there, but 
has not necessarily lived there before. Thus there is a parallel with the 
amended version of Kenny's criterion, i.e., that there is an implication 
from 'is 6 ing' to 'has not s6 ed' with performance verbs, while there is 
no implication from 'is 6 ing' to either 'has 6 ed' or 'has not 6 ed', 
with activity verbs.
In the case of the distinction between static and other verbs however, 
this feature seems to run contrary to the criterion given. The statement 
'his pain is lasting for a long time' makes sense, but is at the same time 
a continuous use of the verb 'to last for'. But if 'taking', 'lasting for' 
and 'going on for' are to serve as criteria for their corresponding 
categories, then they must in a secondary sense, be performance, activity 
and static verbs respectively.
His point that only performances can take the adverbs 'quickly' and 
'slowly', because only performances can be complete or incomplete, has been 
shown to require greater elaboration. And it seems that this point has a 
great deal to do with the criterion for distinguishing performance and 
activity verbs. For if it were true that, in the case of activity verbs,
'x is ing' implies 'x has b ed' then it would follow that there would
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never be an Instant where it was true to say 'x is (S ing' and that he 
had not at the same time 6 ed; and therefore that it would never be true 
to say that x had not completed or finished 6 ing. And if it were never 
true that activities were incomplete it could never be true that they 
were complete either.
It is interesting to note however that the distinction he is making 
here does hold between both performance and activity verbs and the category 
of verbs which he fails to mention, e.g. 'win' and 'reach', which are not 
of any of the three types he has given. 'X wins' does imply 'x has won' 
and can therefore be neither complete nor incomplete. The contrast also 
holds for static verbs, to which the same applies.
So it looks as if the systematic elaboration of the uses and 
implications of continuous and non-continuous tenses would allow many of 
Kenny's problems to fall into place. This has been indicated by Potts (op. 
cit.) when he argues that the perfect tense is not a proper past tense at 
all. Whether the situation is as clear-cut as that is open to doubt. It 
does seem, however, that in some of its uses, especially in its continuous 
sense, the perfect tense does not refer to a preceding time period, as in 
the case where it is always true to say 'I have been 6 ing' as soon as 
and at the same time as it is true to say 'I am 6 ing'. This raises the 
question of what is involved in the concepts of 'as soon as' and 'at the 
same time as'. Does it mean that the perfect tense, as used here, refers 
to the same, or to a different, time period?
It has been seen that certain confusions arise over the fact that he 
never makes it clear what role his distinctions between different types of 
verb play in distinguishing between different types of action. It seems 
to be assumed that a performance, for example, cannot be referred to by a 
description containing an activity verb. If it could there would seem 
to be little point in distinguishing between different types of verb in
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the way he does. As it is, his many examples do not stand up to the 
distinctions he makes. This suggests that, although the distinctions 
may be alright, they might apply to the description as a whole of these 
different types of action, rather than only to the verbs used in such 
descriptions.
IX. Substances and human agents
Kenny's distinction has also been criticised by Evans,^ with an 
emphasis on the fact that it cannot be made in terms of types of verbs.
I think that we have covered much the same ground and made similar 
criticisms if in slightly different ways. I have already acknowledged 
the third category of action, viz.transitory acts, for which the strong 
implication from 'A ^s' to 'A has 6 ed' holds, and I have shown how this 
category crosses both the other categories.
Evans also legislates for the distinction only apply to human agents
and not to non-human substances, on the grounds that ascription to
substances is incompatible with one of Kenny's criterial distinctions for
distinguishing performance verbs, namely that all performances, some
2activities and no states, can be commanded. Now I think this may be 
rather a casual way of dismissing substances from taking performance, 
activity or transitory act descriptions. Although both Evans and I (and, 
it would seem, Kenny) are primarily interested in human action, the way 
in which the distinction applies to substances may shed light on considerations 
of intention that the distinction raises when applied to human action. It 
also seems to be the case that performance descriptions, when they are not 
completely intentional, are processes, at least in so far as one can talk 
of someone being in the process of building a house or running to Yass.
1 C.O. Evans op. cit. pp.295-8.
2 Ibid. pp.298-9.
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The value I see in including substances in our categorisation of actions 
is that one can gain a clearer insight into what is meant by saying that 
someone or something is doing something. It seems that when we say of 
the sea that it is bringing about the downfall of the cliff, we are saying 
something similar to what we would say of someone who is carrying on a 
performance but does not realise it, i.e. where the agent's intentions 
need not be taken into account in describing his action as a performance.
Can we say that the sea is engaged in a performance in the same way 
that a man is? We can say that the sea is bringing about the downfall of 
the cliff, such that 'the sea is destroying the cliff' implies 'the sea 
has not brought down the cliff'. Nonetheless this does have an 
anthropmorphic ring to it, rather like talking about the fury of the sea.
We would be more inclined to say that the downfall of the cliff is the 
result of the movement of the sea rather than the terminal point of the 
sea's action in bringing down the cliff.
Evans argues against the inclusion of processes as subjects of the 
distinction on the grounds that Kenny includes as one of the distinguishing 
features of performances the fact that only performances can be commanded. 
But since processes cannot be commanded, Kenny is faced with the dilemma 
of either excluding processes or saying that not all performances can be 
commanded. Evans argues in favour of the former on the grounds that what 
Kenny is primarily interested in is human action.
But it may be possible to argue that even some human performances 
cannot be commanded. Whether human performances can be commanded or not 
depends on the description of what is being performed. For example, a 
man may be running along a road and, when asked what he is doing, say 'I 
am running along this road for thirty miles'. Now x, an observer, may 
know that the town of Yass is exactly thirty miles along the road; and 
A, the agent, may not know this fact. So that it is true to say, of what
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A is doing, 'A is running to Yass without realising it'. And it is 
impossible to command someone to run to Yass without realising it. If 
one commands someone to run to Yass without realising it and he does run 
to Yass, he either realises that he is running to Yass, or he accidently 
runs there, in which case it would not be clear what sense could be given
JU
to the idea that he had obeyed a command in this context.
So it seems that, contra Kenny, not all performances which have a 
human agent can be commanded. It might be argued that 'running to Yass 
without realising it' is not the correct description of what A is doing.
But since Kenny's only condition for an action description is that it can 
be given in answer to the question 'What is A doing?',in this context at 
least the description is quite legitimate.
The problem for Evans now is that the grounds on which he is qualifying 
non-human substances as subjects of the distinction also disqualifies human 
agents in some cases. This means that only intended actions can be 
performances or activities, since only intended actions can be commanded.
(I assume an equivalent force holds here for 'doing x without realising it' 
and 'doing x without intending it'.) It may be a good way of making a 
distinction between performances and activities to limit them to intended 
actions, but then the criterion as it stands would be inadequate, since a 
given description might serve to describe an intended or an unintended 
action, depending on context. So that any attempt to make the distinction 
solely in terms of the description of an action independent of its context 
would fail.
* Professor Herbst has suggested a parallel case where an officer insists 




Evans then goes on to add the third category of transitory acts to 
the distinction,'*' as one which takes the non-frequentative non-continuous 
present tense but is still an action and not a state as Kenny argues.
As we have already seen, the stronger implication between 'A (6s1 and 
'A had b ed' here obtains, such that the former entails the latter.
Verbs such as 'winning' and 'reaching' qualify here. Kenny asserts 
that static verbs are those verbs which cannot take the continuous present 
tense. He also asserts that the use of the non-continuous present with 
static verbs is non-frequentative, whereas it is frequentative in the case 
of performance and activity verbs. This cuckoo category of verbs such 
as'winning' does take the non-frequentative non-continuous present, as in 
'he wins' where this is a description of a particular act of winning and 
where the historic present is being used, such that 'he wins' is equivalent 
to 'he has won'. But it can also take the present continuous, which 
disqualifies it as a static verb.
So transitory acts fill a vacuum necessitated by the amendment to 
Kenny's assertion that, with activity verbs, 'A is b ing' implies 'A has b ed'. 
What we have now are performances, where 'A is b ing' implies 'A has not b ed'; 
activities, where 'A is b ing' does not imply 'A has not b ed'; and 
transitory acts, where 'A b s' implies 'A has b ed'. The argument against the 
distinction being made in terms of types of verbs is reinforced by the fact 
that, with 'winning', 'A is winning the race' implies 'A has not yet won 
the race' which makes winning a performance and 'A wins the race' implies 
'A has won the race', which makes it a transitory act.
As we shall see, Vendler's achievement terms fulfil much the same 
sort of role as Evan's transitory acts.
1 Ibid., p.300.
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XI. Results and consequences
Evans then attempts to reformulate the distinction between performances,
activities and transitory acts on the basis of von Wright's distinction
between the result and consequence of an act: 'the connection between the
act and its result is intrinsic (logical), that between the act and its
consequence(s) extrinsic (causal)'.''" Evans then goes on to distinguish
activities from performances by the fact that in the case of an activity,
the agent 'brings about a result from the moment he starts the activity
2until the moment he stops' ; whereas in the case of a performance 'he 
brings a result after engaging in the performance for some time, and the 
materialisation of the result terminates the performance'.
Let us then take an example of a performance and an activity 
respectively; of a performance take walking to town, and of an activity, 
going for a walk. Now, according to Evans, going for a walk is an activity 
because the intrinsic logical result of having gone for a walk has been 
brought about from the moment the agent starts walking; and walking to 
town is a performance because its result - having walked to town - is only 
brought about after the performance has been engaged in for some time, 
and once he has walked to town he can no longer continue walking to town.
The result of having got to town terminates the performance.
Well, in this example at any rate, the agent, in carrying out the 
performance, is also fulfilling the conditions for an activity, at least 
insofar as in walking he is continuously bringing about that he has walked. 
But it may also be possible that 'walking to town' might be seen as an activ­
ity. In illustrating the distinction between result and consequence,
Evans says: 'If the act is the act of opening a window, it is logically




act cannot be described as the act of opening. Instead the agent would 
be described as performing some other act; namely, the act of trying to 
open the window'.  ^ Now, in the same way, can we not say of the man 
walking to town, that if the act is the act of walking to town, it is 
logically necessary that he should reach the town? Should he not reach 
it, the act cannot be described as the act of walking to town. Instead 
the agent would be described as performing some other act; namely, the 
act of trying to walk to town. If this holds true of the performance of 
walking to town, then certain problems arise. It now seems that whether 
or not walking to town is a performance or not depends on whether it is 
correct to say that the agent is actually walking to town or merely trying 
to do so. In some cases where the agent may be walking but does not make 
it, it may sometimes be appropriate to say that he was walking to town; 
whereas in other cases it may be more appropriate to say he was just trying 
to walk to town. In the case where it may be correct to say that the agent 
actually was walking to town, rather than just trying to do so, one is 
justified in saying that he was continuously bringing about the result of 
having to-town-walked where walking-to-town is a kind of walking, just as 
buffalo-hunting is a form of hunting.
My main points here are that (1) in the case of some performances 
at least a result is continuously brought about, e.g. 'having walked' in 
'walking to town'; and (2) a given description may serve to describe a 
performance or an activity, such that it may be impossible to determine 
in abstraction whether a continuous result is being brought about or not.
So the least we can say of Evans' reformulation is that if the distinction 
can be made at all, it will lie in terms of the fact that a performance has 
a terminal point, while an activity does not. How much further we can
1 Ibid., p.301.
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go in defining or applying the distinction is the main preoccupation 
of this thesis.
XII. Basic performances and activities
Evans then makes further distinctions within these categories. He 
distinguishes basic and compound performances and activities. A basic 
performance or activity is distinguishable by means of the fact that 
neither can be described as a series of sub-activities, performances or 
transitory acts. I wish to take issue with him in the possibility of 
distinguishing either basic activities or performances in this way.
In the case of basic activities there is reason to argue that they 
must be describable as a series of transitory acts. Let us take walking 
again. Walking consists of raising a leg, moving it forward, then putting 
it down again, then raising the other leg etc. Now at any stage where it 
is true to say of someone that he is walking it will be true to say that 
he is doing one of these three things. And each of these three actions 
are themselves activities. So that for Evans they would each be basic 
activities. But each of these activities has a beginning and an end. In 
this case and in the case of any action whatsoever there will be a point 
where the agent starts and stops what he is doing. And the beginning and 
end, the start and stop, of an action must be a transitory act. To quote 
Evans: 'An agent performs a transitory act when he brings it about all at
once, and the result terminates the act'. Likewise an agent performs the 
act of starting to do something when he brings about the result of having 
started to do that thing all at once, and the result, namely that the agent 
has started, terminated the act of starting.
So this would seem to act as a counter-example to both basic 
performances and basic activities.
I would also like to argue that all performances are constituted by 
an activity. Given that any action consists of some physical movement on
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the part of the agent, nothing in the movement taken on its own will tell 
us whether the action is a performance or an activity. Taken purely as 
physical movement, all we can say is that the movement starts and stops.
We cannot say that there is logically some point beyond which the 
movement cannot continue. Whether an action has a terminal point or not 
or indeed whether it is an action at all, is a function of the description 
of the physical movement. Assuming that any movement can be ascribed to 
a non-human substance so that it becomes the action of that substance, 
then we can say of any physical movement that it must be either an activity 
or a transitory act. That much is certain. But in order to determine 
whether a given physical movement is a performance or not, we have to go 
beyond the mere physical movement. For example a human body is seen on a 
road, moving in a manner characteristically known as walking. Now, 
depending on how we analyse the bodily movement, whether we take just the 
instant when a foot touches the ground (transitory act) or the complete 
cycle of foot raised, foot moved forward, foot put down (activity), we 
know that the movement is either an activity or a transitory act. And as 
yet we are unable to tell whether there is a terminal point to the action.
It is only once we take cognizance of the end of the agent that we are able 
to determine whether the action is describable as a performance. So that, 
in this sense at least, an activity must be basic to a performance. As has 
been suggested it also seems that any action is redescribable as a series 
of transitory acts, again on the basis that such a distinction rests not on 
observable features of a given physical movement, but on how we describe 
it. Given that raising an arm is a basic activity, we break down the 
description 'raising an arm' into an infinite number of stages of the actual 
movement. And at least one stage of this breakdown we will find as 
instantaneous a movement as we are likely to find in a transitory act. It 
is not as if we can measure physical change to determine whether it is
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transitory. An act is as transitory or as intransitory as we choose 
to make it within a relative conceptual framework.
But given these qualifications it still seems possible to distinguish 
basic activities. Given that any activity can be described as a series 
of transitory acts, we can take as a basic activity that which is 
(a) continuous in time; and (b) not describable as a series of sub-activities 
So that, by the same token, we can define a basic performance as being 
constituted solely by a basic activity.
XIII. Vendler on tense and time
The distinctions made by Zeno Vendler^are very similar to those made 
by Kenny. He also distinguishes verbs which take continuous tenses and 
those that do not. And within the group of verbs which do, he distinguishes 
verbs which have, and those which lack, 'terminal points', the former 
being called accomplishment terms, and the latter activity terms. A 
terminal point he defines in terms of the distinction between taking 
time and going on for a time: 'pushing a cart may go on for a time, but it 
does not take time; the activity of drawing may also go on for a time, 
but it takes a certain time to draw a circle... Running a mile and drawing 
a circle have to be finished, while it does not make sense to talk of 
finishing running or pushing a cart' (p.145).
But, unlike Kenny, Vendler makes a further distinction within the 
group of verbs which cannot take continuous tenses, in terms of the 
distinction between verbs which 'can be predicated only for single moments 
of time (strictly speaking)' (p.146) and those which 'can be predicated 
for shorter or longer periods of time' (ibid.). The former he calls 
achievement terms and the latter state terms. 'One reaches the hilltop, 
wins the race, spots or recognises something, and so on at a definite moment 
On the other hand, one can know or believe something, love cr dominate 
somebody, for a shorter or longer period.' (Ibid.) It is worthy of note
1 Z. Vendler 'Verbs and Times', Philosophical Review LXVI (1957).
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in passing, for further comment, that, first, achievement terms clearly 
fill the gap that made Kenny's distinctions incomplete; and secondly, 
that there is a certain incongruity in classing verbs like 'to win' in 
a category of verbs lacking continuous tenses; 'he is winning at the 
moment' makes ample sense. But there is the suggestion that the continuous 
present is used here in a rather different way than in the case of other 
types of verb.
Vendler goes on to make an interesting point about achievement terms 
when he ascribes to them a quality originally defined by Aristotle 
(Met. IX, vi, 7-10), namely that once a statement using an achievement 
term is true in the present tense, it is also true in the perfect. Further, 
he says, 'in cases of pure achievement terms the present tense is almost 
exclusively used as historic present or as indicating immediate future.
"Now he finds the treasure (or wins the race, and so on)" is not used to 
report the actual finding or winning, while the seemingly paradoxical 
"Now he has found it" or "At this moment he has won the race" is' (p.147).
Vendler also makes parallels between accomplishments and achievements 
on the one hand and activities and states on the other. The first pair 
presuppose unique and definite time periods, while the latter imply time 
periods that are neither unique nor definite.
He goes on to make a further distinction within the group of state 
terms, which Kenny again does not make; that is between specific and generic 
states. The distinction rests on the fact that, for some terms, such as 
'being a cabdriver' or 'being a dogcatcher' there are specific activities 
which, when performed a number of times, entitle the performer to be credited 
with the relevant state. Such activities are in this case 'driving a cab' 
and 'catching dogs' respectively. While there are other states, such as 
'being a ruler of a country' or 'being an educator', for which there is no 
such specific activity; there is no activity which can be specifically
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identified as ruling or educating. Of the difference between the ruler 
and the painter he says; 'Is he (the ruler) "ruling" only while he is 
addressing the assembly and surveying the troops, or also when he is 
eating dinner at a state banquet? We feel that some of our actions are 
more appropriate than others to his state as a ruler, but we also feel 
that none of them in particular can be called "ruling". Of course, a 
painter also performs diverse actions which are more or less related to 
his profession (e.g. watching the sunset or buying canvas); nevertheless 
there is one activity, actually painting, which is the activity of a 
painter' (p.151) .
Vendler goes on to say much that is interesting about the relations 
between these different types of term. But I wish to cast attention 
mainly on his more basic distinctions and to compare and contrast them 
with Kenny's.
XIV. Kenny and Vendler
One general point of contrast between Kenny and Vendler is that 
Vendler does not assume that the distinction between these different kinds 
of doing and being rests solely on the verbs in themselves. He is 
careful to distinguish only between different types of term; and, in 
distinguishing between accomplishment and activity terms he distinguishes 
'running' (activity) and 'running a mile' (accomplishment).
Vendler's distinction between accomplishment and activity terms seems 
to correspond almost exactly to Kenny's distinction between performance 
and activity verbs. But it is interesting to note that their criteria 
differ, at least in form. But substantially there are close connections. 
Vendler distinguishes accomplishment and activity terms in terms of 
completeness and the idea of finishing. And it has already been seen that 
there is a close connection between Kenny's basic distinction between 
performance and activity verbs and the feature outlined in Section V. In
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f a c t  t h e r e  i s  an a lm o s t  e x a c t  p a r a l l e l  i n  w ord ing  h e r e  w i t h  V e n d l e r ' s  
c r i t e r i o n .  Kenny s a y s  ' A c t i v i t i e s  and s t a t e s  may be p r o l o n g e d  i n d e f i n i t e l y  
or  t h e y  may c e a s e ;  p e r f o r m a n c e s  come t o  a d e f i n i t e  end and a r e  f i n i s h e d '
(op .  c i t .  p . 1 7 7 ) ;  V e n d le r  says  ' t h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  drawing  may a l s o  go on 
f o r  a t i m e ,  b u t  i t  t a k e s  a c e r t a i n  t ime t o  draw a c i r c l e . . .  ( a c c o m p l i sh m e n t )  
. . .Runn ing a m i l e  and drawing a c i r c l e  have t o  be  f i n i s h e d ,  w h i l e  i t  does 
n o t  make s e n s e  t o  t a l k  o f  f i n i s h i n g  r u n n i n g  or p u s h in g  a c a r t '  ( p . 1 4 5 ) .
I  have  a l r e a d y  a rg u e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  adequacy  of  a d i s t i n c t i o n  drawn 
a lo n g  t h e s e  l i n e s  ( s e e  p . 8 ) .  I n  f a c t  what  I  want  t o  a r g u e  i s ,  n o t  so 
much t h a t  t h i s  s o r t  o f  c r i t e r i o n  i s  f a l s e ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
c l e a r  and p r e c i s e  t o  c ove r  p o s s i b l e  a m b i g u i t y  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Both 
Kenny and V e n d le r  a r e  g i v i n g  p u r e l y  l i n g u i s t i c  c r i t e r i a ,  i n  t e rm s  o f  
common u s a g e ,  t o  make a d i s t i n c t i o n  which s u r e l y  r e q u i r e s  a d e e p e r  l o g i c a l  
a n a l y s i s .
L e t  us t h e n  examine a g a in  t h e s e  n o t i o n s  o f  t a k i n g  t i m e ,  go ing  on f o r  
a t im e  and t h a t  of  f i n i s h i n g  som e th in g .  T a k in g  t i m e ,  i t  i s  i m p l i e d ,  h a s  an 
a i r  o f  c o m p l e t e n e s s  abou t  i t  t h a t  go ing  on f o r  a t im e  l a c k s .  Fo r  so m e th in g  
t o  t a k e  a c e r t a i n  l e n g t h  o f  t im e  i m p l i e s  t h a t  once a c e r t a i n  p o i n t  i s  
r e a c h e d  w h a te v e r  i s  b e i n g  done ca nno t  be c o n t i n u e d ;  whereas  i f  so m e th in g  
goes on f o r  a t ime  t h e r e  i s  no s e t  p o i n t  a t  which  t h e  a c t i o n  b e i n g  done 
ca n n o t  be c o n t i n u e d .  So i f  Kenny and V e n d le r  a r e  r i g h t ,  t h e r e  c a n n o t  be 
a c a s e  where an a c t i o n  can  be m e a n i n g f u l l y  s a i d  t o  t a k e  t im e  and f o r  which 
t h e r e  i s  no s e t  p o i n t  a t  which t h e  a c t i o n  must  c e a s e ;  and no c a s e  o f  an 
a c t i o n  which  c a n  be m e a n i n g f u l l y  s a i d  t o  go on f o r  a t im e  and f o r  which  
t h e r e  _is a s e t  p o i n t  a t  which t h e  a c t i o n  must  s t o p .  Of c o u r s e  t h e  t r o u b l e  
h e r e  l i e s  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  what  i s  or i s  n o t  a 'm e a n i n g f u l  u s a g e ' . But  i n  
t r y i n g  t o  e s t a b l i s h  examples  t h i s  problem may n o t  be r e l e v a n t .
A pa rad igm  c a s e  -  i t  t a k e s  H e r b e r t  f i v e  m i n u t e s  t o  r u n  a m i l e ;  and  on 
th e  o t h e r  hand ,  H e r b e r t  i s  r u n n i n g  f o r  a l o n g  t i m e .  The re  i s  an asymmetry
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in the syntactical form of the two examples. And it seems that the second 
example cannot take the form of the other and retain its original force, or 
rather, the sentence becomes grammatically uncomfortable. 'Herbert is 
taking five minutes to run a mile' deprives the first example of its 
frequentative sense. 'It goes on for a long time, Herbert's running' is 
not English English, and if the noun clause is put in the right place, 
so that one gets 'Herbert's running goes on for a long time' it contains 
a frequentative sense that 'Herbert is running for a long time' lacks.
It may help in trying to elucidate what Vendler and Kenny are saying 
by examining an earlier point made in the same paragraph as his assertion 
about finishing, which has been shown to be closely connected to Kenny's 
point about taking, and going on for a time. Vendler says: 'If I say of 
a person that he is running a mile or of someone that he is drawing a circle, 
then I do claim that the first one will keep running till he has covered 
the mile and that the second will keep drawing till he has drawn the circle. 
If they do not complete their activities, my statement will turn out to be 
false' (op. cit. p.145). The sentence I have underlined amounts to much 
the same sort of assertion that I have implied is being made by Kenny in 
making the 'taking-going on for' distinction, i.e. that there is a sense of 
necessary completion in the one case that the other lacks. But let us 
take a situation in which A says of X 'X is running a mile'. But X does 
not in fact run that mile (X being a lazy fellow) and subsequently says 
'I was running a mile, but I stopped before I completed the distance'.
As I have suggested in discussing Evans, there is a distinction here 
between 'running a mile' and 'trying to run a mile'. Vendler suggests when 
he says 'If they do not complete their activity my statement will turn out 
to be false', that only when an action which takes a performance or 
accomplishment form (such as 'running a mile') is successful, can we say 
that the action was an accomplishment at all. Whereas, as I have argued
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before, it may be possible that in the case of a particular person 
running a mile, say Roger Bannister, it would be plausible to say that 
he was running a mile, rather than trying to, even if he did not make it; 
whereas this could not be plausibly said, say, of an overweight, unfit 
person who collapses in the middle of the run. In the first case it would 
be meaningful to say Roger Bannister had stopped running a mile, whereas 
in the second,one would have to say something to the effect that he was 
unsuccessful in his attempt to run a mile. Since it would be meaningful 
in the first case to say he stopped, and stopping and finishing here have 
the same force, it seems that 'running a mile' would here be seen as, 
and used as, an activity, and not just an accomplishment, term.
Vendler says 'running a mile and drawing a circle have to be finished, 
while it does not make sense to talk of finishing running or pushing a 
cart'. On what grounds does he assert that it does not make sense to talk 
of finishing running? If he is arguing from ordinary usage then surely 
it makes sense to say 'X has finished pushing the cart'. It may be 
objected that in this case the correct formulation is 'X has st opped 
pushing the cart' and so on for any counter-example that may be put 
forward. But this does not provide grounds for asserting that it does 
not make sense to say 'X has finished pushing the cart'. I only wish to 
point out both Kenny and Vendler rely rather heavily on linguistic usage 
in cases where greater spelling out of contexts which determine legitimacy 
or illegitimacy of usage is clearly needed. How is Vendler going to 
establish that 'X has finished pushing the cart' is an incorrect formulation 
without becoming circular, i.e. without coming back to his point that 
running a mile involves a process for which there is a fixed terminal 
point, whereas running simpliciter does not? Of course Vendler can say 
that in those instances where 'X has finished pushing a cart' _is meaningful, 
the statement in question is elliptical, that in fact the speaker has failed
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to mention some underlying presupposition about the activity in question, 
which, if made explicit, would turn the statement into the description 
of an accomplishment. For example Mrs Omo, in saying that her son Alphonse 
has finished pushing the vehicle in question, may be speaking elliptically 
on the basis of an expanded description of what Alphonse was doing, 
namely 'Alphonse is pushing the cart until tea-time'. Vendler can argue 
that 'X has finished pushing the cart' is meaningful only where 'pushing 
the cart' is used elliptically to cover up what is really an accomplishment 
term, as in 'X is pushing the cart to Rome' where 'pushing-the-cart-to- 
Rome' is the hidden accomplishment term. But this game can be played in 
any case where in 'X has finished I ing' is an activity term. So that 
what Vendler should have said in the first place is, not that it does not 
make sense to talk of finishing pushing a cart - discomfort alone does not 
establish nonsense - but that where one does talk of finishing in relation 
to an activity term, the context in which it is used will turn out to 
presuppose an implicit completeness in the term such that it is really an 
accomplishment term wearing a beard. But Vendler is using the fact that 
there are instances where it does not make sense to talk of finishing 6 ing 
in order to make the distinction between accomplishment and activity terms. 
So that it seems he cannot use this point about linguistic usage as a 
criterion.
I think therefore, that there may well be grounds for questioning the 
validity of distinguishing performances, activities and states on the basis 
of either the verb used or some other part of the sentence. The verb 
to run can be used either to refer to a performance or an activity; and 
the term 'running a mile', while it may be most commonly used to refer 
to a performance, can be used to refer to an activity, e.g. 'he runs a 
mile every day', depending on the tense employed.
30
So it seems that the best way to go about making the sort of distinction 
Kenny and Vendler are after is to consider the description as a whole and 
elaborate the tense implications in terms similar to those used in the 
amended version of Kenny's criterion for distinguishing performance and 
activity terms. It is on the fact that the implications have not been 
sufficiently elaborated that I base my criticisms of Kenny and Vendler.
XV. Categorisation of tenses
Corresponding to the differences in time referred to, the three basic 
tenses are clearly the past, present and future tenses. But within this 
basic framework there obtain more specific differences; under the category 
of past tense come the perfect, imperfect and pluperfect tenses; under the 
present, the historic and the non-historic; and under the future, the 
ordinary future and the future perfect. This seems to be the standard way 
of specifying these tenses under their respective genera.
But then one finds that the use of a particular tense does not always 
indicate that the proposition in which the tense is employed implies its 
correlative time reference, or at least it is not always immediately clear 
that it does. For example, it has been seen how an ambiguity in Kenny's 
use of the perfect tense gave rise to too strong a definition of his 
distinction between performance and activity verbs. And this was because 
of an ambiguity in the form of 'X has 6 ed' between 'X has 6 ed (before)' 
and 'X has been 6 ing (and still is)', the former referring to the past 
and the latter the present. In common usage the distinction is often 
rather cloudy. So there is a further distinction to be made relating to 
all these tenses, namely that between continuous and non-continuous use, 
which in some cases implied a cross-reference to categories. These cases 
will need looking into.
In other cases one cannot even point to an underlying distinction.
It often depends solely on the context in which the tense is used - like
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'has been ...ing' - to show that for example, a future tense verb is
being used to refer to a present time period (whatever that means).
'X will have b ed' is a case in point; 'X will have 6 ed by now' refers
to a past time period in that it entails 'X has 6 ed'; while 'in ten
years X will have 6 ed' refers to a future time period.
So in outlining the conditions under which a verb under a given tense
category is used to refer to a non-correlative time period category, two
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types of distinction need to be differentiated;
a) where the use of the verb is one which covers up an internal 
distinction, as in the case of the distinction between continuous 
and non-continuous use.
b) where the cross-reference is determined by external factors in 
the description.
XVI. Time past, time perfect
There seems to be some confusion as to how a given tense relates to a 
given time period. I wish in this section to examine some of the issues 
that have been raised by Kenny and Vendler's discussion of tenses when 
making their respective distinctions.
As we have seen in the last section, there seems to be some doubt as to 
whether the perfect tense refers to a past time period in all its uses.
In examining Kenny's criterion for distinguishing activity verbs we saw that 
there exists an ambiguity between cases where the perfect tense refers to 
a discrete past time period. There is the sort of case where there is a 
lapse of time between the time period referred to and the use of the perfect 
tense in some statement such as 'he has lived in Rome' where the force of 
the statement is that he has lived in Rome at some period not necessarily 
immediately preceding the time at which the statement was made; and cases 
where the perfect tense is used to refer to a non-discrete time period 
where the time period referred to immediately precedes the making of the
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statement, e.g. 'He has lived in Rome' where the force of the statement 
is that he has been living in Rome and still is. It might be said of 
this last case that the proposition could be better expressed by using 
the continuous perfect, viz 'has been', and this would indeed seem to 
be a more concise expression. But it is not the case that the continuous 
perfect always refers to an immediately previous time period. A person 
could say 'I have been living in Rome' when he is nowhere near Rome, but 
in London or Timbuctoo.
So it seems that reference to an immediately previous or a discretely 
past time period cannot be decided on the basis of the use of the continuous 
or non-continuous perfect tenses taken on their own. Both tenses can be 
used to refer to either kind of time period depending on the context in 
which they are used.
But there is another kind of time reference that the non-continuous 
perfect tense can make. This is what has been called the radio commentator's 
use where, for example, at the exact moment when the horse passes the 
winning post, the commentator says 'Pharlap has won'. In reference to 
exactly the same event and at exactly the same moment the commentator could 
have said without loss of meaning 'Pharlap wins'. So that in this sort of 
case the perfect tense is being used to refer to the present, insofar as 
the present and perfect tenses are interchangeable in this context. And 
I take it that this is what Ryle means by his 'got-it' verbs, Vendler by 
his achievement terms, and Evans by the idea of a transitory act.
XVII. Aristotle and the energeia-kinesis distinction
Now the distinction which Kenny, Vendler, Ryle et al. are harking 
back to when making these kinds of tense implications is Aristotle's 
distinction between energeia and kinesis. The point of Aristotle's 
distinction is to distinguish 'actions which contain their own end' from
actions whose ends lie outside themselves'; between 'perfect' and
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' i m p e r f e c t '  a c t i o n s .  And an e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  A c k r i l l ' s  a r t i c l e  on t h i s
d i s t i n c t i o n  shows t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some c o n f u s i o n  a s  t o  t h e  r o l e  t h a t  t im e
p l a y s  i n  t h e  making o f  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n .  A r i s t o t l e  h i m s e l f  i n t r o d u c e s  t h e
i s s u e  of  r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  t e n s e s  when he sa ys  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  an  e n e r g e i a :
' a t  t h e  same t im e  one s e e s  and has  s e en ,  u n d e r s t a n d s  and  h a s  u n d e r s t o o d ,
t h i n k s  and h a s  t h o u g h t ;  w h i l e  i t  i s  n o t  t r u e  t h a t  a t  t h e  same t im e  one
2
l e a r n s  and h a s  l e a r n t  or  i s  b e i n g  c u r e d  and  h a s  been  c u r e d '  , t h e  fo rm er  
b e i n g  e n e r g e i a  and t h e  l a t t e r  k i n e s i s .
Now t h e r e  seems t o  be an a s su m p t io n  made by most  comm enta to rs  t h a t  
t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  t e rm s  o f  t h e  t e n s e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  s u g g e s t e d  a b o v e ,  can  
s e r v e  as  a c r i t e r i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  j u s t  an e x p r e s s i o n  or i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  p e r f e c t  and i m p e r f e c t  a c t i o n s ;  t h a t  where t h e  p r e s e n t  
e n t a i l s  t h e  p e r f e c t ,  t h e r e  you have an e n e r g e i a  and where t h e  p r e s e n t  e n t a i l s  
i t s  n e g a t i v e  i n  t h e  p e r f e c t ,  t h e r e  you have a k i n e s i s .  But  i t  h a s  be e n  
a r g u e d ,  by K. Lycos i n  an u n p u b l i s h e d  pape r  on A c k r i l l ' s  a r t i c l e ,  t h a t  t o  
g iv e  t e m p o r a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  such a p r im a ry  r o l e  may l e a d  t o  a d i s t o r t i o n  
o f  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ;  t h a t  t h e  t e m p o r a l  r e f e r e n c e s  may be s e c o n d a r y  t o  t h e  
p o i n t  of  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  wh ich i s  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  a c t i o n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
form.  And t h i s  can  be shown by  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  when one a p p l i e s  s t r i c t  
t e n s e  c r i t e r i a  t o  one o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  examples  o f  an e n e r g e i a ,  namely  
e n jo y m e n t ,  one f i n d s  t h a t  i t  f u l f i l l s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  when g iven  t h i s  
p u r e l y  t e m p o r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n ,  f o r  b e i n g  a k i n e s i s .  To d e m o n s t r a t e :
At t h e  same t im e  one e n j o y s  and has  e n jo y e d .  But  one a lw ays  e n j o y s  
s o m e th ing  ( ' t h e  whence and w h i t h e r  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  f o r m ' ) .  But  i f  one i s  
e n j o y i n g  t h e  o p e r a ,  one h a s  n o t  e n jo y e d  t h e  o p e r a ,  which  would seem t o  
make en joym ent  a k i n e s i s  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  I f  one commits o n e s e l f  t o  a 
p u r e l y  t em p o ra l  and  t e n s e - t y p e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  making  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  a s  
A c k r i l l  and o t h e r s  seem t o  have done,  t h e n  A r i s t o t l e  seems t o  be  v e r y
1 J . C .  A c k r i l l ,  ' A r i s t o t l e ' s  D i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  E n e r g e i s  and K i n e s i s ' ,
New E s s a y s  on P l a t o  and A r i s t o t l e  e d . R. Bambrough, London 1965.
2 M e ta p h y s ic s  Q( l048b  2 3 - 2 5 ) .
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confused. But if, on the other hand one sees such temporal considerations 
as merely secondary indications of a more metaphysical distinction, then 
one sees that Aristotle is making a far more subtle distinction. If one 
accepts that enjoyment is an energeia even if it is true that 'he is enjoying 
the opera' implies 'he has not enjoyed the opera' then one can see that what 
are usually taken to be kineseis can function as energeiae in certain 
circumstances; that the same actions can be done either as kinesis or as 
energeia. If a man has been building houses for most of his life and for 
him house-building is second nature, then at a particular instance of his 
house-building, the achievement of the terminus of his house-building, that 
the house has been built, may be a secondary consideration in terms of what 
he conceives of himself as doing. Rather he may see himself as engaged 
in an activity rather than a performance. He may see himself as flexing 
his house-building muscles, such that the fact that the house is built 
may be, for him, an arbitrary point in his activity.
XVIII. Description of action
This leads on to problems in the description of action. A spatio- 
temporal event can be described in numerous different ways. One may or 
may not ascribe agency to an object participating in the event. Differences 
of perspective alter the 'character' of the action, or even what the action 
is. The description of an action given by that of the agent of the action 
may differ from that of an observer etc. All these considerations tend to 
make it difficult to determine what is the 'correct' description of what 
is being done. And among these problems also come the even more intangible 
questions about motive, intention and the reasons for acting.
Kenny, in establishing a functional criterion for determining the 
appropriate description of an action, says that an action, for the purposes 
of his distinction, can be whatever can be given as a response to the 
question 'What did A do?' Now it is clear that it was outside the scope
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of Kenny's particular investigation to raise questions about the 
description of action. But, in the light of the criticisms that have 
been made of the way he has made his distinction between performances 
and activities, it seems that such considerations do have an effect on 
the distinction. To what extent, I shall be examining in the next chapter.
Chapter 2. The distinction in context
In the last chapter I endeavoured to show that Kenny's distinction 
between states performances and activities was inadequate on two main 
grounds.
1. The criterion governing the distinction between performance and 
activity verbs needed to be amended. Rather than asserting that 
'A is 6 ing' implies 'A has 6 ed' in the case of activity verbs, 
one must be satisfied with the weaker implication that 'A is
6 ing' is consistent with 'A has 6 ed' or to put it in another 
way, 'A is 6 ing' does not imply 'A has not 6 ed'. This is a 
point that both Williams and Potts make in slightly different 
ways.
2. The performance-activity distinction cannot be made in terms
of types of verb since there are cases where a performance verb 
can function as an activity verb and vice versa.
Evans'*' also argues against the distinction in terms of verbs on the 
grounds that a verb in one category can be made to function in the other 
category depending on whether the object of the verb is singular or 
undistributed plural. For example 'He is killing a seal' implies 'He has 
not killed the seal' which makes 'killing' a performance verb; whereas 
'He is killing seals' does not imply 'He has not killed seals' which makes 
'killing' an activity verb.
How then is the distinction to be made? Can a comprehensive definition 
of the distinction be made at all? Well, first it might be appropriate 




Kenny claims to be making a purely grammatical distinction without any 
necessary connection to actions that happen to be called 'performance' 
or 'activities' in ordinary usage. Evans points out the unreliability 
of Kenny's claim by (a) demonstrating the pointlessness of calling the 
two types of verb he is distinguishing 'performance' and 'activity' verbs 
respectively if he does not intend there to be some connection between the 
types of verb and what their names are commonly taken to name; and (b) pointing 
out that Kenny seems to be making just the assumption he denies he is 
making when halfway through distinguishing types of verbs he switches 
to talking about states, performances and activities per se and outlining 
their distinctive features.
I shall assume that we are distinguishing different kinds of action 
and that whatever linguistic distinctions we make do have some application 
in this field, even if it is at varience sometimes with our ordinary 
understanding of the terms 'performance' and 'activity'. What I intend 
to do is examine three possible ways of making the distinction and see if 
it is possible to arrive at an adequate definition.
The three possible ways of making the distinction between performances 
and activities,as the distinction is expressed through language,I take to 
be as follows:
A) A 'context-free' account, an example of which we have seen in 
Kenny. In other words, an account which makes the distinction in terms 
of some part of language taken in abstraction from the contexts in which 
it might be used.
B) A 'context-bound' account which treats of language primarily as speech 
act and this makes an understanding of the distinction dependent on the 
intentions of the speaker or hearer, agent or observer, in describing a
given action.
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C) A middle way between these two accounts, in which in some cases, 
or in part, the distinction can be made on a purely grammatical basis, 
but may in some cases need modification by the context in which the relevant 
piece of language is put.
XIX. The context-free account
We have seen how Kenny defines the distinction solely in terms of 
types of verb, the implication being that where one finds a particular 
verb in whatever context that verb will fulfil the conditions for being either 
a performance or an activity verb but not for both, and that once a 
performance verb always a performance verb and vice versa. And we have 
seen certain objections made against this way of making the distinction.
I have shown that the verb can be modified in a sentence in such a way 
that the verb crosses categories.^ I shall now attempt to see if a 
modified context-free account can be given in terms of any other component 
of the sentence either in isolation or in combination with other components, 
or in terms of the sentence taken as a whole.
XX. Verbs
At the risk of being tedious, I would like to take one last look at 
the role the verb plays in this discussion. Let us take the verb 'to walk'. 
Let us take three possible uses of the verb 'to walk' in a sentence:
a) 'X is walking'.
b) 'X is walking' (where the sentence is elliptical).
c) 'X is walking to his room'.
Now a) satisfies the conditions for an activity verb. 'X is walking' 
does not imply 'X has not walked' - indeed, in one sense it implies that 
he has walked in the sense that he has put at least one foot forward in this 
particular instance of X's motion.
1 Cf also Evans op. cit.
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c) on the other hand satisfies the conditions for a performance verb. 
'X is walking to his room' implies that he has not walked to his room, 
since if he had he would not still be walking there.
Now in any case where we find the sentence 'X is walking', it will 
not be obvious that what we have is an instance of a) which is an activity 
verb, or of b) which is elliptical and may in one case indicate (i) a) 
which is an activity verb; or (ii) 'X is walking' where the verb is 
elliptical and ambiguous, since its indefiniteness may indicate 'nowhere 
in particular' which implies an activity verb, or 'somewhere in particular' 
which implies a performance verb ('X is walking somewhere in particular' 
implies 'X has not walked to that particular somewhere').
So that b) indicates an ambiguity between a) and c). In order to 
resolve this ambiguity it would be necessary to look at the context in 
which the sentence was placed in order to find a resolution.
So here we have another argument against making the distinction in 
terms of types of verb. But one possible way out of this objection that 
Kenny could assert is that in the ambiguous b) case, what we have are two 
different kinds of verb rather than different kinds of sentence. What we 
would now have are the two verbs 'to walk' and 'to walk to a particular 
somewhere'. But now it would seem that what are being distinguished are 
different kinds of predicate rather than verbs.
XXI. Predicates
But as soon as we start trying to distinguish predicates in the same 
way the same problem arises. Let us take the predicate 'is walking to his 
room'. What do we now make of the sentence 'X is walking to his room 
regularly nowadays'? 'Is walking to his room' which was a performance 
predicate is now converted into an activity predicate, since 'X is walking 
to his room regularly nowadays' does not imply 'X has not walked to his 
room' .
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So i t  now seems t h a t  i f  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  can  be  g iv e n  any s o r t  of
c o n t e x t - f r e e  a c c o u n t  a t  a l l ,  i t  must  be made i n  t e rm s  of  t h e  s e n t e n c e
t a k e n  as  a whole ,  and t o  q uo te  Evans:
With t h e  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  g ram m at ic a l  r u l e s  a p p ly  t o  
p a r t i c u l a r  s e n t e n c e s  a nd  n o t  t o  v e r b s  as  such comes t h e  
r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  K e nny 's  g ram m at ica l  c r i t e r i a  have  l o s t  
t h e  s i m p l i c i t y  which was t h e i r  c h i e f  a p p e a l .  ^
We have  a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  c o m p l e x i t i e s  t h a t  Evans examines .
I  w ish  now t o  examine t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of g i v i n g  a c o n t e x t - f r e e  a c c o u n t
of  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  t e rm s  o f  t h e  s e n t e n c e  t a k e n  as  a w ho le .  Evans seems t o
assume t h a t  such an a c c o u n t  can be  g iv en ,  so t h a t  t h e  r e s t  o f  h i s  c o n c l u s i o n s
do n o t  im m e d i a t e l y  c o n c e r n  u s .
X X I I . The s e n t e n c e
In  s e e i n g  w h e th e r  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  can be made i n  t e rm s  o f  t h e  s e n t e n c e  
t a k e n  as  a w ho le ,  I  s h a l l  t r y  t o  g iv e  a c a s e  o f  a s e n t e n c e  which  i s  
ambiguous ,  and f o r  which  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  of  such an a m b i g u i t y  depends on 
t h e  c o n t e x t  i n  which  t h e  s e n t e n c e  i s  p l a c e d .
One p rob lem  which we s h a l l  n o t  f i n d  as  we d i d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  v e r b s  
and  p r e d i c a t e s  i s  t h a t  of  e l l i p s i s .  As we saw, an argument  a g a i n s t  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e i n g  made i n  te rm s  of  v e r b s  and  p r e d i c a t e s  was t h a t  t h e y  c o u ld  
f u n c t i o n  i n  s e n t e n c e s  which  m igh t  or  m igh t  n o t  be e l l i p t i c a l  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  c o n t e x t  i n  which t h e y  were p l a c e d .  When d e a l i n g  w i t h  s e n t e n c e s  as  
a whole however ,  an e l l i p t i c a l  s e n t e n c e  i s  n o t  a whole  s e n t e n c e .  Where,  
f o r  example ,  we have t h e  s e n t e n c e  'X i s  xi /alking'  on t h e  one h a n d ,  which i s  
c o m p l e t e ;  and 'X i s  w a l k i n g . . . '  which i s  e l l i p t i c a l ,  what  we a r e  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  a r e  two d i f f e r e n t  s e n t e n c e s ,  which i m m e d i a t e l y  r e s o l v e s  any a m b i g u i t y  
t h a t  may a r i s e  f rom t h e  f a c t  t h a t  one of  t h e  s e n t e n c e s  i s  e l l i p t i c a l  and  
i n c o m p l e t e .
1 I b i d  p .297 .
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I shall take the two forms of sentences that have mainly concerned us so far 
and see how each relates to the distinction:
a) 'A is 6 ing', where the sentence is not elliptical, but the verb 
lacks an object, as opposed to, for example, 'A is building a house', where 
'a house' is the object of the verb 'to build' (i.e. I am not considering 
compound verbs such as 'to-build-a-house'). In every instance I can 
imagine 'A is 6 ing' does not imply 'A has not 6 ed' and would therefore be 
descriptive of an activity.
b) 'A is 6 ing y' where 'y ' is the object of the very 'to 6 '. In 
most cases sentences of this form tend to describe performances. For 
example, 'A is running a mile' implies that A has not run the mile.
Let us take the sentence 'A is making something'. Now this seems 
open to two interpretations:
a) 'A is making something' in the sense that there is a particular 
thing which A is making, that A knows what he is making even if no one 
else does, and that he could tell us if we asked him. In this case 'A is 
making something' implies 'A has not made that something' which makes the 
sentence a performance sentence.
b) But what if no one knows what A is making, not even A himself.
In this case we cannot say that A is bringing about p, since there is no 
way of determining what p is. He may say 'In a way I'm just mucking about 
with clay; but you never know, something might come out of it'.
Suppose that after anhour or so of messing about with the clay, A 
suddenly gets up and walks away. We question him about what he has been 
doing. He could either say 'I've just been playing around with clay. I 
thought I'd stop'. Or he could say; 'I have just finished an eternal 
monument to the agony of man'. Now in the first case he is describing 
what he is doing as an activity, since he just stopped doing what he was
doing and there was no intrinsic reason why he had to stop when he did.
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In the second case, on the other hand, there was an intrinsic reason why 
he stopped. He had just completed a great piece of sculpture. How do we 
know? He said so. It is up to us and others to determine whether it is a 
great piece of sculpture. But that it is a sculpture and that the sculpture 
is finished is true if he says it is. He can say 'At first I was just mucking 
about with clay. Then I suddenly saw it - the agony of man!' How do we 
describe what A was doing in the first case, where what would normally be 
taken to be the description of a performance turns out to be the description 
of an activity?
To recapitulate: we observe a man with some clay. The clay is being 
put into different shapes by the man. So an adequate description of what 
A is doing at this stage is 'A is messing about with clay' which is the 
description of an activity. We approach A and ask him what he is doing.
A says 'I am making something' and so we discover that he has not just been 
messing about with clay but on top of this description comes the description 
'making something' which is the description of a performance. But then we 
ask A what he is making. And he says 'I don't know'. How now are we to 
describe what he is doing? On the one hand we can say that what he is doing 
is describable as a performance, since strictly speaking there is a something 
which, once he has made it, he cannot continue making. But in another 
sense there is no thing which, once he has made it, he can no longer be 
said to be making, since there is no identifiable thing which he is making.
But, accepting what he says even if we are a little confused, we await 
the outcome of what he is doing. But to our surprise and disappointment he 
suddenly swears, hurls the clay onto the ground and goes off for a drink.
When he calms down we point out that what he was really doing was messing 
around with clay - he wasn't making any thing at all. In response he 
heatedly affirms that he was making something but that it didn't work out.
To which we say 'Well you can always go back and finish it'. Almost in 
despair he cries that it would be impossible to finish it if he didn't
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know what it was. He just stopped - that's all. But he was still making 
something. So it seems that what he has been doing is both an activity 
and a performance.
Let us try the scene again. We walk up to him as before but, this 
time knowing him to be a sculptor of some repute, we suggest that he is 
making another of his masterpieces. But he growls back that he is just 
messing about with clay, in such a tone that suggests that he is not just 
being modest. We watch him for a while, satisfied that what he is doing 
is describable as an activity. But then he suddenly stops, stands back 
from the clay, and says, with some satisfaction, 'There you see before 
you the agony of man' and the clay eventually goes off to adorn the foyer 
of some business establishment. But we are confused and quite reasonably 
say that we thought he was just messing about with clay. He replies that 
we now know better, that in fact he was creating his latest masterpiece.
And again we seem to have a case of an action being both a performance and 
an activity.
Now in both these cases I think the paradox can be resolved. In 
both cases we can say to the sculptor that he was wrong in both instances; 
that in the first what he thought was a performance turned out to be only 
an activity; and in the second what he thought was an activity has turned 
out to be a performance. My point in giving this example has been, however, 
to show that with a sentence like 'A is making something' we have to look 
at the context in which the sentence is used before we can determine whether 
the sentence describes an activity or a performance. And secondly that this 
clarifies our way of looking at the distinction; i.e. we have to think of 
it more as a way of distinguishing actions than as a way of distinguishing 
pieces of language. This example has shown that we may in many cases 
have to address ourselves to the action first and then see how it is
described, rather than the other way around.
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XXIII. The context-bound account
I now want to turn to the second of the possible ways of approaching 
the distinction that I outlined at the beginning of the chapter.
In the last section we saw how it was necessary to look at the context 
in which an action was performed in order to determine whether it was a 
performance or an activity. I want now to look at the problems that may 
arise when we do look at an action in context. One of the major problems, 
as was suggested in the example about the sculptor, is that of intention.
As well as in the case of the sculptor, we have seen the problem arise also 
in the discussion about non-human agents as subjects of the distinction.
Before proceeding with an examination of the role of intention in the 
distinction, I would like to make clear by uses of the word. The word 
'intentional’ is applied primarily to verbs and sentences, and is a logical 
property of them; an action is 'intended' when an agent intends to perform 
it, and in doing it he may have an intended end to be achieved. I shall 
use the term 'extra-intentional' to indicate that considerations of the 
intention of the agent, or the intentionality of the describing verb or 
sentence, are not relevant to the description of a particular action.
XXIV. Intentionality
Now the statement 'I am running to Yass' seems also to entail a 
statement of the intentions of its speaker. 'I am running to Yass' seems 
in many cases to be clearly related to 'intend to run to Yass'. And in this 
case the verb seems to be intentional, in so far at least as it satisfies 
Anscombe's three criteria of intentionality; Yass need not exist; the object 
'Yass' resists substitution over identity, e.g. as when substituted by 'the 
wildest town this side of the Blue Mountains', since the agent might say 
'I shall never run to the wildest town this side of the Blue Mountains' while 
still intending to run to Yass; and in a controversial sense the object 
is indefinite, i.e. there is no particular place in Yass to which he is
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running, and the point at which he is in Yass, though determinable, is 
vague. I say that the sense of 'indefinite' being used here is controversial, 
since it has been objected that 'Yass' is not indefinite in the same way 
as 'a salesman' is indefinite in the sentence 'I am expecting a salesman'.
But I do not want to involve myself here with a discussion of the logic of 
intentionality. I merely want to mention in passing that the fact that the 
verbs in this context seem to be intentional reinforces the claim that 
statements of the form 'I am d ing y', where this is a performance 
description, function intentionally.
Is this the case with all performance descriptions which have a human 
being as agent? One can think of extraordinary cases. Our sculptor may 
be messing around with his clay and suddenly exclaim 'Good Lord! I'm 
creating a sculpture expressing the agony of man! I didn't intend to do 
that'. But this may not be a good example since once he does realise what 
he is doing and if he carries on doing it, then he will certainly be 
intending to finish this new creation. The question now becomes 'Was he 
creating a sculpture expressing the agony of man before he realised that 
this is what he was doing?' It certainly seems legitimate to say, or rather 
it does not sound odd to say 'I was creating a sculpture and did not realise 
it'. But in fact it seems that here he is putting himself in the position 
of an observer ascribing intention. We must break up the whole process of 
the coming-to-be of this sculpture into two parts; the first in which he 
says 'I am messing about with clay'; and the second where he says 'I am 
creating a sculpture'. If we could not do this here then we could not make 
a similar distinction in more clear-cut cases, for example if Neville 




But this last example raises further questions about the intentionality 
of performance descriptions and about the characterisation of actions 
generally. It also raises problems about the nature of the idea of someone 
bringing something about. Let us assume that the man we see on the Yass 
road sincerely says 'I am running to Yass'. This translates according to 
the definition already given as 'I am bringing it about that I have run to 
Yass'. Do we have to take agent A's description of what he is doing as the 
correct description of his action? Can we deny that he has correctly 
described what he is doing, yet accept that this is what he intends to do? 
There does seem to be difference here between doing something and trying 
to do something. We may know that , while A may be a very sincere and 
well-intentioned man, he is no runner. So that when he says 'I am running to 
Yass', we say 'That's a bit strong isn't it? Wouldn't it be more accurate 
to say that you're just trying to run to Yass?' And he says 'You wait.
I'll show you'. To which we respond 'Even if you do in fact run all the way 
to Yass, all that can be said to be doing now is that you're trying to do 
so. Your getting to Yass will merely mean that you succeeded in your attempt 
And if you don't make it because you're such a poor physical specimen, then 
you can't really expect us to say you were running to Yass in the same way 
that we might say that you were running to Yass once you had actually done so
But let us suppose A to be a health psychotic who runs to Yass every day 
When we see him on the road we are less inclined to say 'A is trying to run 
to Yass'. Since he does this sort of thing every day we are more inclined 
to say that he is engaged in an activity, such that even if he dies of a 
heart attack on the way we would still say he was running to Yass rather than 
just trying to do so.
In this case we would say that 'running-to-Yass' is the operative verb 
rather than just 'running' in such a way that 'A is running-to-Yass' does
not imply 'A has not run-to-Yass', and further that while in a strict sense
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he is bringing something about, in a more important sense he is not, 
since as we have seen it does not matter whether in fact he makes Yass 
or not.
One might say that at the furthest end of this kind of activity 
description which looks at first as though it is a performance description, 
a more correct characterisation of what A is doing is something like 'A is 
bringing it about that he is fit'. So that running to Yass becomes the 
means to some further end, namely 'having got fit'. But we can redescribe 
almost any action, whether it be described as a performance or an activity, 
in this way. How are we to determine whether it is appropriate to redescribe 
the action or not?
The only case in which a redescription cannot be given is in the case 
where the agent says 'I'm just 6 ing and that's all' and this description 
as 'just 6 ing' can be the description of either a performance or an 
activity. For example our man on the road may say 'I'm just running; I 
don't want to get fit or be anywhere' and this would be an instance of an 
activity; or he might say 'I'm running to Yass. I just felt like it'.
But in cases where the action is capable of redescription, if the agent 
is running in order to get fit or is running to Yass to catch a train, it 
always seems possible to say 'And why are you doing that?' to all his 
descriptions until the agent is forced to say 'I don't know. I can't 
explain my action any further'. Are we to assume that the final character­
isation of his action is the correct one? Let us take an example: A says
'I am running to Yass'; we ask why and he says 'to catch a train'. So the 
action can be redescribed as 'A is catching a train'. Why? 'To go to 
Melbourne'. So what he is doing becomes redescribable as 'A is going to 
Melbourne', and so on until we get a characterisation of his action as 
follows 'A is running to Yass to catch a train to go to Melbourne to
collect a harpsichord to bring it back home with him to play it to enjoy
himself'. Now it may be absurd to say of the A that we find on the road
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that a correct description of what he is doing is 'enjoying himself' and 
clearly false to say he is playing a harpsichord. To say he is collecting 
a harpsichord seems dubious. If, on our asking him what he was doing, A 
were to say 'I'm collecting a harpsichord', we would, I think, find this 
an acceptable if in some way incomplete description. We would not say 
'You could not possibly be collecting a harpsichord', in the same way that 
we would deny the possibility that he was playing a harpsichord.
The problem seems to be as follows:
1. We can distinguish two kinds of end to an action; a logical and 
a contingent end. The contingent end is the purpose of an action.
2. An action whose logical end is 'p ' in the description 'bringing 
it about that q' such that q, which was the contingent end of the action, 
now becomes the logical end of the action under this second description.
3. But it is not possible in all cases correctly to redescribe the 
action in this way, e.g. while it is possible to redescribe an action 
originally described as 'catching a train' as 'collecting a harpsichord', 
it is not possible to redesceibe the action of collecting a harpsichord, 
whose purpose is to play it, as 'playing a harpsichord'.
The question is: under what circumstances can we describe an action 
by making its purpose under one description its logical end under another, 
and under what circumstances are we unable to do this?
We have here a number of action descriptions which can be given in 
answer to the question: 'What is A doing?'. They are as follows:
1. 'A is running'
2. 'A is running to Yass'
3. 'A is catching a train'
4. 'A is collecting a harpsichord'
In this example the subsequent description has been given as the 
contingent end or purpose of the action under the description preceding it. 
For example, the purpose of 'running to Yass' has been given as 'to catch
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a train'; and I have argued that the action of running to Yass is 
redescribable in the form 'catching the train' by virtue of the fact 
that both can be given as true answers to the question 'What is A doing?'
The question arises as to whether the fact that two different 
answers can be given to the one question entails that two different 
descriptions are being given of the same action. It might be argued that 
'catching a train' is not a description of a performance at all, since, 
although it is true to say that 'A is catching the train' implies 'A has 
not caught the train' and entails 'A is bringing it about that he has 
caught the train', there is no constitutive action which A must be doing 
in order to qualify for the description 'A is catching the train'. In 
fact A can be quite motionless, e.g. if he is sitting on the platform, 
and still to be said to be catching the train.
This is different from the performance of running to Yass, since this 
can only truthfully be said of A if he is in fact running. So it might 
be argued that there is no particular action of which 'catching a train' 
is an alternative description. This seems a very similar case to that 
which Vendler mentions in referring to activities such as ruling, of which 
no one action is both sufficient and necessary to constitute the activity 
of ruling a country. But 'catching a train' is not an activity in this 
context but a performance.
In many ways 'catching a train' like 'winning a race' seems to be capable 
of functioning as a transitory act or achievement. At the same time as it is 
true to say 'A catches the train' it is true to say 'A has caught the train'.
In the discussion of Evans' distinction between basic performances 
and activities, I came to the conclusion that, if basic performances were 
to be distinguished, then the only proper basis on which we could 
distinguish basic from compound performances was by asserting that basic per­
formances were constituted by basic activities. But now it seems that we
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have a further distinction between kinds of performances. For where before 
we had a basic performance being distinguished on the grounds of its being 
constituted by a basic activity, as, for example, where the basic activity 
is 'moving a finger' and the corresponding basic performance is 'putting a 
finger on the shelf'; now we have the case where there is a distinction 
between performances constituted by a series of continuous activities as 
opposed to performances constituted by a series of discontinuous activities. 
For example, one can distinguish 'walking thirty miles' which consists of 
the series of basic activities that make up walking, from 'collecting a 
harpsichord in Melbourne' which may consist of a large number of activities, 
(and also, probably, performances), including possibly, 'walking'.
But then we also have cases where a number of performances (and 
activities) can come under a blanket activity description, such as Vendler's 
example of the ruler, who makes laws etc., as part of the activity of 
ruling.
So it seems that a) anything can be described as a performance or an 
activity; b) in many, if not all, cases a given action description can 
serve to describe a performance or an activity. These two points only 
seem to hold however, if we assume that there is no one correct description 
of an action. The assumption behind a) and b) is that an action is_ as a 
person, whether he be the agent or an impartial observer, conceives it to 
be. I shall now examine this question of the correct description of an 
action, especially as it relates to the intentions of the agent and the 
ascription of intention to the agent by an observer.
XXVI. Correct description
Let us return to our benighted sculptor. As we have seen, his bodily 
movements suggested the description 'A is messing around with clay'. But 
in one case he hotly denied that this was a correct description of what he 
was doing. He stated that he was engaged in the performance of making a
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sculpture. If he had carried on and actually made a sculpture, his 
description of what he was doing would have been correct and ours would have 
been wrong. The question I now wish to ask is: 'Is it possible to give a
description of what A is doing which precludes the possibility of our 
description being falsified by A's own description of what he is doing?'
Well, we can certainly say of A that his hands are manipulating the 
clay. And A can hardly deny this fact. But A may say that this may be 
what his hands are doing, but it's certainly not what he is doing. We 
arrive at the well-known distinction between 'My hand is moving' and 'I 
am moving my hand'. Let us say that A is in a trance, or is sleep-sculpting. 
Would it be a correct description of the event to say that 'A was moving 
his hand' rather than saying that his hand was moving. Say we come up to 
A and say 'I see you are moving your hand' and he says 'No I'm not'. And 
we say 'You are wrong. I distinctly saw you move your hand'. And he says 
'My hand may have moved but I certainly didn't move it'. And we say 
'You may not have realised it, but that's what you were doing'. A pauses for 
a while and says 'I suppose I must have been. I was moving my hand and 
didn't know it. Now isn't that a peculiar thing'. In many cases such 
as this we would be justified in saying that he wasn't being himself just 
then and may even, if we had faith in such institutions, feel justified in 
getting him committed to a mental hospital. For, if he 'wasn't himself' 
who was he? It might be objected that 'he isn't himself' is just an 
idiomatic use of language not to be taken too seriously. But even so it is 
not clear that it is appropriate to ascribe agency to A in the same way as 
we would where it was quite clear that he did realise what he was doing.
I am afraid I am encroaching here on to problems of personal identity around 
which much philosophical controversy still rages. Since I do not wish to 
involve myself here in a discussion of these problems, I shall look for 
some other way out of the problem.
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So far we have been looking at an example of an action being described 
as an activity. What if this movement of A's hand is described as a 
performance? What if we say to A 'Oh look! You're making a shape'.
Now, 'making a shape' is a performance description since it is impossible to 
have made a shape while still making it. Now A says 'I'm not making a 
shape. What shape? I know I have been making shapes with this clay, but 
that happens with every movement of my hand'. There's no particular shape 
that I'm making'. To which we reply 'Even if neither of us knows what 
shape you are making, you are still at this very moment making a shape.
Stop moving your hands. (He stops.) There. See? You've made a shape.'
It would seem here that the shape that is being referred to here is 
rather the contingent result of what A has been doing rather than its terminal 
point. A could have stopped at any stage and a. shape would have resulted.
We have seen that the terminal point of an action is that point beyond which 
an action cannot be continued. In this case it can be argued that there is 
such a point but that it cannot be identified. Is it necessary to be able to 
identify the terminal point of an action in order to describe that action 
as a performance? As a performance description has been defined so far, 
it would not be necessary, since the terminal point of performance has 
been defined as the state of affairs that exists when it is true to say 
'has 6 ed' as in 'A is bringing it about that he has 6 ed'. So that we can 
feel justified in saying that A, in messing around with clay, is making 
a shape, whether this is what he intended or not. So it seems that an 
agent can be carrying out a performance without intending to do so. But 
this would only be the case under an observer's description, not the agent's.
Are there cases of performances which can only be described as 
performances because the agent intends them to be so? I think we have 
already seen that this can be the case with the sculptor. Having stopped 
his manipulation of the clay, he declares that he has finished his sculpture
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expressing the agony of man. Now, as far as we may be concerned, he could 
have stopped at any number of places and we would have been none the wiser.
He is engaged in the performance of creating a sculpture on the agony of 
man because he says so, (although we might be justified in saying he was 
doing a number of other things he did not realise he was doing, such as 
scattering clay all over the place), and he has finished his work when he 
says so.
Well, what does this say about the correct description of an action?
In the first place it seems that it is much easier to gain mutual agreement 
between agent and observer that a particular activity is being engaged in, 
than that a particular performance is being carried out. For example, it 
can easily be established by both parties that the sculptor is manipulating 
clay. This seems to be a correct description. But we have also seen that 
it is also a correct description that the sculptor is creating a sculpture 
and not just manipulating clay, if only because he says that this is what 
he is doing (always assuming of course that he is not lying). So it seems 
that there are a number of correct descriptions of the action and not just 
one proper description. And, if this is the case, it seems that any attempt 
rigorously to define the distinction between performances and activities 
in terms of types of description, while it may succeed in some cases, is 
always liable to be undermined by the impossibility of always being able to 
apply the distinction to a certain range of events. To try to do so is to 
fall into the Procrustean fallacy of trying to make events fit language, rather 
than assigning language its proper function or providing an ever shifting grid 
through which we can order the shapeless flux of events to our purposes.
XXVII. The problem of definition
I may now be in a position to summarise the discussion so far. We 
began with Kenny's distinction between types of verb. Kenny formulated
two rules:
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Rule I - verbs which take the non-continuous present are static 
verbs.
As we have seen, there are verbs which take the non-continuous present 
which can also be used in the continuous present as performance or activity- 
verbs.
Rule II- In the case of performance verbs 'A *6s' implies
'A has not 6 ed' and in the case of activity verbs 
'A 6s ' implies 'A has 6 ed'.
We have seen that this implication does not hold for all activity 
verbs and that the implication is too strong. It requires amendment to 
the effect that 'A 6s' does not imply 'A has not 6 ed' and is consistent 
with 'A has 6 ed'. This amendment deprives the distinction of its 
exhaustive nature. The ensuing gap is filled by those verbs which take 
the non-continuous present but do not fit any of Kenny's three categories. 
These correspond to Vendler1s achievement terms, and I have followed Evans 
in calling them transitory act descriptions.
I have argued, as has Evans, that the distinction cannot be made 
solely in terms of the verbs used. And I have gone on to argue that a 
purely grammatical distinction is not capable of dealing with the 
description of every action; that it is necessary in some cases to put 
the description in the context of the agent's intentions before one can 
make any kind of distinction in the way we are attempting.
One of the main problems of making this distinction is that there 
are so many different ways and modes for making it. As Potts and Taylor 
have pointed out both Kenny and Vendler are basing their distinctions on 
Aristotle's energeia-kinesis distinction. But, as Ackrill has pointed out, 
even Aristotle had problems. Aristotle used his distinction to cover a 
wide field for, as well as covering different kinds of action in a moral 
and psychological context, the distinction also had a metaphysical force.
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In other words, not only was the distinction between an action done for 
its own sake and one whose end lies outside itself, but also related to 
processes and the way we perceive events (another reason why it might have 
been rash for Evans to exclude substances from the distinction). This 
metaphysical application can be seen by the fact that Aristotle distinguishes 
energeia from dunamis (actuality from potentiality).
So it seems that what contemporary philosophers have done is take a
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wide-ranging distinction and applied it to actions using the tools that have 
evolved with the development of contemporary linguistic philosophy. As has 
been seen a preoccupation with grammar has made the distinction either 
useless or impossible to make in some circumstances. Once the elegance 
of a purely grammatical distinction is lost we are overwhelmed by a tidal 
wave of complexities.
Is it possible to get to the bottom of this distinction? Or is this 
search for an essence misguided. A superficial examination of the 
complexities that are inherent in an attempt to make the distinction in 
a not completely grammatical way has, I think, indicated that we cannot 
ignore the intention of either the agent of an action or the ascription 
of intention to the agent by an observer, when describing what has taken 
place at a given time in a given place. But to what extent must we take 
into account such intentions and to what extent can we give an intention-free, 
'objective' account of actions within the framework of the distinction?
It also seems to be the case that we can talk about the distinction, 
and to a large extent apply it without in fact having adequately defined it. 
And I would like to suggest that a neat and tidy definition is not possible. 
All we can hope for is a wide number of different kinds of expression of a 
V  distinction possibly as basic as that between form and matter . It would
be ambitious in the extreme to hope to enumerate and analyse all such 
expressions and their relationships in a thesis of this scope. I would,
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however, like to use this problem to take a look at the problem of the 
description and characterisation of action as a means for analysing a 
particular moral problem, without further attempting to give a rigorous 
definition of the distinction between performances and activity verbs, 
terms, sentences, descriptions or whatever. What I want to suggest is 
that the distinction, whatever it is, can be applied in a given context 
to give correspondingly different moral characterisations to a particular 
act, that it may illuminate how language can be used as a means for ration­
alisation and the confusion of moral issues.
Chapter 3. An entry into the logic of rationalisation
XXVIII. Recapitulation
So far I have argued that (1) the distinction between performances and 
activities has not so far been shown to be capable of comprehensive definition; 
(2) but it may still be a useful distinction and we may still be able to give 
expression to the distinction in particular cases.
I want now to expand the claim that I have made in (2). While this 
point may be implicit in Evans' account, he does in fact attempt a 
definition. Such a definition may well be useful in some limited cases.
But he still seems to be clinging to the idea that there is just one 
definition. But what does he claim to be distinguishing? On the one hand 
he may be, like Kenny, making a philosophically technical distinction, such 
that the terms 'activity' and 'performance' are only to be understood as 
technical terms; in which case it seems at best limited, and at worst, 
arbitrary. Or on the other hand, he may be saying that this is the logical 
basis on which the terms are used in ordinary language; which I have already 
argued is false because it is not comprehensive. Ironically, this dilemma 
is just the one that Evans claims Kenny faces. And indeed it may be a 
dilemma that anyone faces in attempting to define a distinction or a term.
So, on this ground if on no other, I shall try to look for distinctive 
features as they present themselves in our actual use of these terms rather 
than attempt anything more than a sketchy and ad hoc definition at most, 
accepting that any definition I may postulate is likely, as with fireflies, 
to have a very short life-span in any particular context.
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XXIX. The terminal point
One distinctive feature that does stand out is the idea of the terminal 
point, the point beyond which an action cannot be continued and still be the 
same action. And this does seem to fit in with an ordinary language 
understanding of a performance, as an event which is limited spatially or 
temporally or both spatially and temporally. The trouble so far has been that 
of trying to define the conditions of such limitation. And I have suggested 
that the limitations to such events are as people see them. The relevant 
'people' here are the agent and the observer; both may differ as to the 
limitations and these differences lead to different descriptions of the 
action, and maybe even different conceptions of what the action is. It is 
the point of this chapter to look at the significance of such differences 
in a particular case.
XXX. Tenses and times
But before doing this, it is worth looking further at the issues 
involved. It seems that many have felt themselves tied to temporal 
considerations over and above the fact that performances and activities 
occupy time. There seems to be the desire to see a particular significance 
in the use of tenses in the description of actions. Kenny sees the crux 
of the distinction in the fact that with performance descriptions 'A is 
6 ing' implies 'A has not 6 ed'. I have already argued against this in 
the example of the sculptor. In an obvious way he is making a shape, but 
in such a case the idea of a point beyond which he cannot continue making 
a shape is meaningless, since he could stop at any time and still have made 
a shape. It is only meaningful here to talk of there being a terminal point 
beyond which he could not continue if it was possible to identify the shape 
he was making before he had made it. Any ex post facto account would involve 
the paradox where one says that there was a terminal point to his action, 
only it was impossible to know what it was until after he had made it. (I
am allowing here for the case where the sculptor happens to stop and then
59
sees the arbitrary shape that happens to have been formed as the shape 
that he was looking for. But then he would have been looking for the 
shape, rather than making it.)
But maybe a more important example is the one where a man who, under 
an observer's description, is building a house, but in his own eyes is 
house-building. The difference is that for the observer, the agent has 
finished his action when the house is built, but for the builder the 
completion of the house is quite incidental, so that it would be meaningful 
for him to deny that he is 'building a house' in so far as 'building a 
house' is taken to be the correct description of what he is doing. It does 
however remain the case that if he is building a house, he cannot continue 
building it once it is built. And this may be useful knowledge where it 
is quite clear what the agent is doing. It may not be quite so useful in 
cases where the characterisation of the action is in doubt.
XXXI. Telos and end
The terminal point of an action needs to be distinguished from its end, 
although in some cases the distinction may be difficult to make. The term 
'end' seems to have a wider meaning than 'terminal point'. In some cases 
what we mean by the end of an action may be the terminal point of the action, 
or it may be quite logically distinct from it, as where the action is that of 
running to Yass where the terminal point is to be in Yass, while the 
contingent end of the action may be to be in Melbourne.
Aristotle, distinguishing between energeia and kinesis, claims to
be distinguishing actions whose 'ends lie outside themselves' from actions
which 'contain their own end'^ and between 'imperfect actions' which 'have
2a limit' and 'perfect actions' which 'have no limit'. It has been assumed 
by subsequent commentators that temporal considerations determine the
1 Nichomachaean Ethics (1174a pp.14-23).
2 Metaphysics 06(1048b pp.18-35).
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distinction. But it depends very much on what is to be understood by the 
end of an action. There seems to be a difference between the limit of an 
action and any end it may have. The limit of an action as Aristotle 
expounded it appears to be its terminal point. While the end of an action, 
'which lies outside itself' does not seem necessarily to be related logically 
to the action in the same way as its terminal point, the idea of the telos - 
the point - of an action seems to be independent of considerations of time. 
And this is at least one of the senses in which the end of an action is 
to be understood.
If a man is described as running to Yass, the logical end, the terminal 
point, of that action is the state of affairs that holds when it is true 
to say that he has run to Yass. But the contingent end, the telos, of 
running to Yass, may be something else again such as being in Melbourne or 
getting some exercise.
'Being in Melbourne' and 'getting exercise' seem to be different kinds 
of ends. While both are capable as serving as the telos of the action of 
running to Yass, 'being in Melbourne' lies outside the action in a way that 
'getting exercise' does not. 'Being in Melbourne' is a state of affairs 
both temporally and spatially distinct from the action of running. 'Getting 
exercise' however, is spatially and temporally coextensive with running to 
Yass, since the agent is getting exercise all the time he is running to Yass. 
Another difference lies in the fact that one could say of a man that he was 
getting exercise while running to Yass without knowing that this was his end; 
whereas one would not know that he was going to Melbourne by running to 
Yass without knowing that this was his express intention.
But, it may be argued, this is to misunderstand what Aristotle 
understood by 'end' in this context, that we did not mean that it was the 
telos of the action which lay outside itself, but rather the terminal point.
The terminal point, it may be argued, lies outside itself in the sense that
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it has not been achieved while the action is being engaged in, and an 
action contains its own end in that it has no terminal point; that it can, 
logically at least, go on indefinitely. Any point at which it does stop 
is not logically determined by the nature of the action.
This argument seems to be the basis on which those who seek to give 
a purely temporal account of the distinction seem to rely. And it 
certainly seems to apply in many cases. But it seems also that the 
inadequacy of the temporal account serves to show up the inability of the 
above interpretation of the 'lies outside itself' - 'contains its own end' 
distinction. There may be another way of looking at the distinction, i.e. 
in terms of the end of an action, where on the one hand the means are 
distinguishable from the end, and on the other the end and the means are 
indistinguishable, as with 'running to Yass' and 'getting exercise'.
A contingent end of an action also seems to 'lie outside' the action 
in a stronger sense than the way in which a terminal point 'lies outside it', 
since the contingent end is logically quite independent of the action; 
while the terminal point is logically bound to the action in so far as 
it terminates the action and to a large extent specifies it. There seems 
to be a difference here between a logical account of the idea of an end 
lying outside the action and a spatio-temporal account.
It does seem, however, that there is a relationship between these two 
accounts. If 'to be in Melbourne' is the contingent end of the action 
'running to Yass' then we can redescribe the action of 'running to Yass' 
as 'getting to Melbourne'. So that what is the contingent end of what is 
being done under one description turns out to be its terminal point under 
another description. This does not apply, however, where one has an action 
which lacks a terminal point. Say the contingent end of the action described 
as 'getting exercise' has the end 'to be sound in body, if not in mind', 
then the redescription 'being sound in body, if not in mind' lacks a
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terminal point. But 'being sound in body' seems to be coextensive, in the 
way I have outlined, with the action involved in getting exercise.
So that the distinction between activity and performance in terms of 
a distinction between a contingent end 'lying outside itself' and 'contained 
in the action' as I have outlined it, may parallel the distinction being 
made in terms of an action having or lacking a terminal point. The 
difference between these two accounts may be relevant in the case of 
differing descriptions of an action. The case of the house builder seems 
to demonstrate that an observer's description of what he is doing, that 
he is engaged in a performance because he is building a house, may be 
secondary to the agent's description - that he is engaged in the activity of 
house-building, in the sense that it is the perfection of a skill. Or 
the agent might claim that the primary description of what he is doing is 
the building of a block of houses, not just one house. These differences 
of emphasis may be highly significant in a moral or legal context.
What I have tried to show is that there may be more than one way of 
looking at the performance - activity distinction, through our understanding 
of the difference between an action 'whose end lies outside itself' and 
one 'which contains its own'. And it seems likely that these two approaches 
ultimately express the same underlying distinction. I do not think, 
however, that it is easy to argue that one account is more basic than the 
other. All that we are justified in asserting is that they are alternative 
accounts. There may be others. The distinction between 'in' and 'by' 
understood in a certain sense, seems to be one. And the idea of an action 
done 'for its own sake', in one sense, seems to parallel the notion of an 
action which contains its own end.
XXXII. Aristotle on acts and activities
Aristotle, in the Nichomachaean Ethics, makes an implicit distinction 
between an act and an activity, and he talks of both as being good or bad,
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virtuous or vicious. He also talks of dispositions and the way in which 
what we do affects their virtue or viciousness, and the way in which 
dispositions affect the virtuousness or viciousness of what we do. In 
Chapter I Book II he makes two main points:
1. Our actions determine our dispositions.
2. Like activities produce like dispositions.
And in Chapter II he says that once a virtuous disposition has been 
formed, then their virtue will be expressed in correspondingly virtuous 
actions.
So there seems to be three stages; the first in which particular 
actions determine a particular disposition, then the disposition becomes 
settled such that it becomes embedded in an activity, which then produces 
similar actions. If I may be allowed to put the difference between act 
and activity here rather loosely, it seems that actions 'determine' or 
cause the development of, dispositions; while activities 'produce' or 
express dispositions in particular actions. So that activities seem to 
form as a result of the determination of the disposition. And a particular 
action can be seen either on its own as the cause of a disposition or as 
part of an activity, where it functions as the expression of a disposition. 
In contemporary language we make such a distinction as when, for example, 
we consider a felony, in isolation, when performed by a first offender, as 
opposed to its performance as part of an activity engaged in by an habitual 
criminal.
Our discussion so far has, I think, touched on a similar kind of 
distinction. We have seen how, in the case of the house-builder, the 
character of his action changes according to whether we see what he is 
doing as a performance in isolation or as part of an activity. The 
distinction between basic and compound activities also seems to be relevant 
here. The kind of activity Aristotle seems to be talking about here is 
the compound activity, which contains a performance.
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In fact, basic activities seem to function more often than not as 
base-level, extra-intentional descriptions of an event. I have already 
argued that all performances are intention-laden, unless one is treating 
non-human substances as agents, or human agents as non-human substances.
The case of the house-builder has shown how what would normally be thought 
to be a fairly straightforward extra-intentional description, turns out to 
contain assumption about the builder's intention. There is an assumption 
in the description 'A is building a house' that his primary intention is 
to have the house built; where as this may be quite secondary for the 
builder. Indeed it is conceivable that he had not even considered the 
completion of the house, so that it would be of no importance whatever 
if he finished it or not.
XXXIII. The Auschwitz builder - a moral problem
I want to conclude this thesis by examining a particular example in 
the light of the two main factors:
1) How the distinction between performance and activity may be 
relevant to the example.
2) What effect the characterisation of an action as a performance 
or an activity has on the moral character of the action, i.e. 
the responsibility of the agent, what he was responsible for, 
his blameworthiness etc.
X is a builder living in Nazi Germany. In the middle of Second World 
War he obtains a government contract to construct some buildings. The 
buildings he constructs turn out to be the Auschwitz concentration camp. 
Among the building that X has built is a gas chamber.
Now there are a number of descriptions that can be given of X's action.
a) X constructed some buildings
b) X built a concentration camp
c) X built a gas chamber
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X may give us an explanation of his action:
d) That he did not know what he was building, that he was 
'just doing his job'.
e) That he did know that he was building a concentration camp, 
but did not know that in building the concentration camp he 
was building a gas chamber.
f) That he knew that he was building a concentration camp and 
that in doing so he was building a gas chamber, but he needed 
the money.
g) That he believed in the Nazi policy relating to Jews.
Now a), b) and c) are all performances and in this context function 
as basic descriptions. All three are true. But their moral characters 
differ. Constructing some buildings is a morally neutral action. The 
construction of a concentration camp is more morally flavoured. The 
construction of a gas chamber has a high moral voltage.
But while X may have done what a), b) and c) describe, he may not have 
seen himself as doing what he did under each of these descriptions. If 
he did not know that he was building a concentration camp complete with gas 
chamber, then he could not have seen himself as building a concentration 
camp. His culpability lies in ignorance, not in malevolence. This would 
be the case with e). This contrasts with f) where he is culpable of 
negligent opportunism.
In the case of d), X sees what he is doing as part of an activity, 
that of house-building. Again he seems less culpable than in the case 
of g) where he would see what he was doing as part of the activity of 
furthering the cause of the Third Reich.
Now, on the one hand we are faced with judgements of performances, and 
on the other with judgements of activities. And it seems that X can 
rationalise a culpable performance in terms of a less culpable activity,
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e.g. he can rationalise the performance of building a gas chamber by saying 
that he merely saw it as part of the activity of house-building. Or he 
could rationalise the activity of furthering the cause of the Third Reich, 
which subsequent events showed that he did, by saying that he was just 
constructing some buildings. So that the performance-activity distinction 
may serve to identify rationalisations and excuses. Eichman gave as a 
rationalisation of the performance of sending millions of Jews to the gas 
chamber the fact that this was part of the activity of administering the 
laws of the Third Reich. A more immediate example may lie in the case 
of the bombardier in a B-52 bomber engaged in napaiming Vietnamese villages, 
who redescribes the activity in terms of the performance of 'bringing 
political stability to Asia'; or by saying that in engaging in the perform­
ance of wiping out a village, he is engaged in the activity of'preserving 
the human rights to freedom and self-determination'. It seems that there 
is no logical end to preserving human rights, at least in the eyes of 
the American government. This is in contrast to, for example, the 
preservation of jam, for which there exists the terminal point where the 
jam has been preserved and is ready to be eaten.
My point in presenting these last two rather 'jarring' examples is to show 
how what is normally taken to be a performance - preservation - is rational­
ised as an activity. The moral prestidigitation on the part of the United 
States government lies in presenting as an activity, what would normally 
be taken to be a performance. While the linguistic use of the term 
'preserve' seems to be correct, its underlying logic has been distorted.
There are probably many other ways in which the distinction between 
performances and activities has bearing on our moral judgements of actions 
and the agents who perform them. For example there seems to be a closer 
relation between the way an activity characterises its agent and the way 
in which a performance may do so. I have already given the example of
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the way in which a particular crime may characterise the agent as an 
habitual criminal if the particular crime is seen as part of an activity, 
while no such label can be attributed to the agent for whom the particular 
performance is a first offence. A further examination of the application 
of the distinction may possibly lead to some insight into the problem of 
the extent to which a disposition determines an act, and an act determines 
a disposition. But I have been concerned here merely to suggest possible 
ways in which the distinction may be applied. Unfortunately a rigorous 
examination of these possibilities lie outside the scope of this thesis.
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